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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code N. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
?$$ygg PREgEflTED QN APPEAL
1.

Whether Judge Hanson abused his discretion in

refusing to accept opposing memoranda and counteraffidavits four
and a half weeks after they were due and 18 days following
plaintiff s submission of its motion for decision.
2.

Whether the counteraffidavit of defendant Douglas

Kent Allyn was admissible to contest plaintiff' s motion for
summary judgment.
3.

Whether the Allyns admissions, which were not

brought to the trial court7 s attention by the Allyns to contest
Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment, constituted admissible
evidence.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PfiQVIglQNg OR fiVfrEg
Interpretation of the following rules may be
determinative of the issues in this action:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e)
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached hereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
Rule 4-501(1)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Admi ni s t rat i on.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of
a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, all supporting documentation and a
copy of the proposed order. If the
responding party fails to file a memorandum
in opposition to the motion within ten days
after service of the motion, the moving party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to
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the court for decision as provided in
paragraph 1(d) of this rule.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c).
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1(a).
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern
the procedure in the Supreme Court, the
district courts, the circuit courts, and the
justice courts of the state of Utah in all
actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil
nature, whether cognizable at law or in
equity, and in all special statutory
proceedings, except as governed by the other
rules promulgated by this court or enacted by
the Legislature and except as stated in Rule
81. They shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
STATEMENT QF THE Cfr$E
On or about September 2, 1986, Respondent USA Financial
Corporation, dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division
(hereinafter "Interlake") filed three foreclosure actions against
John B. Swank and Douglas Kent Allyn, dba J & D Properties, a
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California partnership, and Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John
Allyn, Sr., dba Allyn and Company, a California partnership, in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.

Two

of these actions, Civil Nos. C-86-6724 and C-86-6725, involved
adjoining parcels of real estate and were consolidated before the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson.

The third action, Civil No. C-86-

6726, concerned a separate parcel of real property and was
brought before the Honorable John A. Rokich.
Interlake propounded requests for admissions,
interrogatories, and requests for production of documents to the
Allyns on April 12, 1988.

The Allyns failed to respond to the

interrogatories and requests for production of documents for over
90 days and ultimately responded only after Interlake' s counsel
threatened to file a Motion to Compel.

In their responses to the

requests for admissions, the Allyns admitted signing a variety of
documents, including trust deeds, promissory notes and renewal
agreements, and further admitted that they failed to make
payments on the promissory notes and that the promissory notes
were in default.
The Allyns' counsel, John Burton Anderson, formally
withdrew from representing the Allyns on June 22, 1989.
Immediately thereafter, on June 29, 1990, Interlake filed and
served on the Allyns a notice to appear in person or to appoint
counsel.

The Allyns ignored this notice.
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On November 6, 1989, Interlake filed Motions for
Summary Judgment in both cases contending there were no genuine
issues of material fact and that Interlake was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

A copy of Interlake's Motions,

Memoranda, and Affidavits are attached hereto collectively as
Exhibit "A".
On the final day for responding to the Motions for
Summary Judgment in the two cases, John Burton Anderson filed
another Notice of Appearance.

He also filed an ex parte motion

requesting that the court postpone consideration of Interlake' s
Motion for an additional 30 days, and that during such time the
Allyns be permitted to file an appropriate response to the
motion.

A copy of this ex parte motion is attached hereto as

Exhibit "B".
On or about November 30, 1989, Interlake filed a
"Request for a Ruling and Objection to Ex Parte Motion" in the
two cases, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit "C",
Interlake thereby objected to Mr. Anderson's renewed appearance
as counsel and also objected to the ex parte motion to extend the
time within which the Allyns would be permitted to respond to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The grounds for these objections

concerned the Allyns' prior opportunities to timely obtain
counsel and the Allyns' consistent pattern of unjustifiably
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attempting to delay the proceedings.

These grounds are set forth

in greater detail in the attached Exhibit " C".
Judge Rokich granted the Allyns' motion, and they
submitted an Opposition Motion of Points and Authorities and
Counteraffidavit from Douglas Kent Allyn in both cases
notwithstanding the fact that Judge Hanson had not granted relief
to file said documents.

Copies of these documents are attached

hereto collectively as Exhibit " D".
On January 5, 1990, Judge Hanson issued his minute
entry, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " E".

The

minute entry denied the Allyn' s motion for additional time within
which to file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment for
the reasons set forth in Interlake' s objection.

Further, the

minute entry granted Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment and
default judgment based on the pleadings and other supporting
documentation submitted in support of the motion.
On January 11, 1990 Interlake filed its Reply
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment and objecting to the above-referenced Allyn
Affidavit in the case before Judge Rokich.

A true and correct

copy of this memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit "F".
On January 24, 1990, Judge Rokich issued his minute
entry, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "G".

The

minute entry granted Interlake7 s Motion for Summary Judgment and
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Default Judgment based on the pleadings and other supporting
documentation submitted in support of the motion.
On February 6, 1990, Judges Hanson and Rokich each
executed and entered an Order and Decree of Foreclosure, a copy
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " H".

Among other things,

this Order and Decree directs the sale of the subject properties
pursuant to Utah law, and the entry of a deficiency judgment
against the Allyns and the other defendants in the event the sale
of the subject properties is inadequate to cover the outstanding
indebtedness.
The Allyns subsequently filed their Notice of Appeal
and Amended Notice of Appeal contesting Judge Hanson' s and Judge
Rokich' s rulings below.
gVMMAfiY QF AR(?VMEflT
The Allyns failed to present specific evidentiary facts
to be offered against Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Allyns' unverified admissions could not constitute admissible
evidence and were not even offered by the Allyns in opposition to
Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Although the Allyns submitted an opposing affidavit,
Judge Hanson was within his discretion to disallow submission of
the Affidavit because the Allyns' delay in filing it violated
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

The

Rules of Judicial Administration take precedence over less
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stringent conditions contained in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In any event, the affidavit was inadmissible because it
was not entirely based upon the affiant' s personal knowledge, it
lacked appropriate foundation, and it violated the parole
evidence rule.

Even assuming that the affidavit were admissible,

it would not eliminate defendants' liability because defendants
also signed the relevant Notes in a representative capacity for a
nonexistent corporation.
ARCTMENT
I.

THE ALLYNS FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO
INTERLAKE' S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY
RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides, in part, that when a party moves for summary judgment,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings, but must by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in the rule, set forth specific facts demonstrating that
there is an issue for trial.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1989);

figfrgaft Ovtflpprftflyertig;U9iIng, yT tAinflgren, 692 P. 2d 776, 779
(Utah 1984); Treloaaen v. Treloaaen, 699 P. 2d 747, 748 (Utah
1985).

This Rule requires specific evidentiary facts to be

offered in opposition to a motion that demonstrate there is a
genuine issue for trial.

I&.

A party who fails to so respond
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w i l l have judgment e n t e r e d a g a i n s t him i f
Civ,

P.

appropriate.

Utah R.

56(e).

A.

Jyflge Hsmgpnfl;Lflr>pt abuse higfrtggretignin
disallowing the submission of the Allvns/
Memorandum in Opposition and the Affidavit of
DQVglflS Kent AUyn T

In the case before Judge Hanson, the Allyns did not
introduce any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary
materials in opposition to the motion.

Although Appellants did

file an &x parte motion for leave to later file affidavits, that
motion was denied by Judge Hanson for the reasons set forth in
Respondent's objections thereto, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "C. "
The Allyns now assert that Judge Hanson erred in
failing to allow the Allyns to submit the affidavit of Douglas
Kent Allyn.

This affidavit was filed with the Allyns' memorandum

in opposition approximately four and a half weeks after it was
due and eighteen days following Interlake' s request for ruling.
The Allyns acknowledge that Rule 4-501(1)(b) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration clearly states:
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion.
Responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of
a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, all supporting documentation and a
copy of the proposed order. If the
responding party fails to file a memorandum
in opposition to the motion within ten days
after service of the motion, the moving party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to
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the court for decision as provided in
paragraph 1(d) of this Rule. [Emphasis
added. ]
The word "shall" in the above Rule clearly mandates
that an opposing memorandum and all supporting documentation must
be submitted within ten days following the service of a motion.
The drafters of the Rule elected not to use the word "may".
Clearly, the drafters did not intend to allow for a substantial
loophole which would allow for the submission of an opposing
memorandum and supporting counter affidavits after a motion has
been submitted for decision.
The Allyns contend, however, that because Rule 56(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the filing of
affidavits prior to the day of hearing, the Rules of Civil
Procedure take precedence over the Code of Judicial
Administration.

Interlake' s research did not reveal any cases

that would resolve this issue and Interlake believes this issue
to be one of first impression.

However, the plain language of

the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly implies that the Code of
Judicial Administration should take precedence.

Rule 1(a) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall
govern the procedure in the Supreme Court,
the district courts, the circuit courts, and
the justice courts of the State of Utah in
all actions, suits, and proceedings of a
civil nature whether cognizable at law or in
equity, and in all special statutory
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proceedings, except as governed bv other
rules promulgated bv this court or enacted by
the legislature and except as stated in Rule
81. They shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action. [Emphasis
added. ]
This Rule indicates that other court rules are to take
precedence over the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Code of

Judicial Administration has been adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council and accordingly should have
priority over less stringent provisions in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

This result comports totally with the stated

intent of Rule 4-501, "[t]o establish a uniform procedure for
requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. "

If

supporting documentation were allowed to be filed up until the
day of hearing, regardless of when the motion was submitted for
decision, chaos rather than uniformity would result and Rule 4501 largely would be circumvented.
Similarly, the stated applicability of Rule 4-501
further indicates its priority over the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Rule states in relevant part:

"This Rule shall apply to

motion practice in all district and circuit courts except
proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims
department of the circuit court. . . "

Ifi.

Note that the

application of the Rule is mandatory and contains no provisions
showing deference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Therefore,

Rule 4-501 controls over any conflicting provisions found in Rule
56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Hanson correctly

refused to accept the affidavit of Douglas Allyn after Interlake
submitted its motion for decision.
Federal case law has long established that where there
is a legitimate basis for a procedural rule, a judge' s
requirement that the rule be followed to the letter is not an
impermissible abuse of discretion even though it may work a
hardship on parties in a particular case.

See Kostenbauder v.

Secretary of Health. Ed. . and Welfare. 71 F. R. D. 449, 453 (M. D.
Penn. 1976, alflfi Feaster v. Weinberger. 556 F. 2d 565 (3d Cir.
1977), af f d Kern v. Weinberger. 556 F. 2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977),
&£L£

Reefl V, Wglnfrgrggr, 556 F. 2d 568 (3d Cir. 1977), aff' d

Yasenchak v. Weinberger. 556 F. 2d 570 (3d Cir. 1977); see also
Doe v. Rostker. 89 F. R. D. 158, 163 (N. D. Cal. 1981) ("this court
has both the duty and the right to ensure compliance with the
Federal Rules and to take action necessary to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases.")

Similarly, Judge Hanson

did not abuse his discretion by adhering to Rule 4-501 and
refusing to accept the affidavit of Douglas Allyn.
Accordingly, Appellants offered no evidence in
opposition to Respondent' s motion in the case before Judge
Hanson.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of

Judicial Administration, the facts set forth in Respondent's
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statement of undisputed facts were deemed admitted for purposes
of summary judgment because they were not controverted by
anything offered by Appellants.

Under these circumstances, this

Court repeatedly has held that "the trial court may properly
conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact unless the face
of the movant' s affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence
of such an issue."

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development

Company. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted);
£££££&, Cowen and Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer Company, 695
P. 2d 109, 114 (Utah, 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire and
CMfVfrltV Company, 743 P. 2d 1217, 1219 (Utah, 1987).
Since the Allyns have admitted the execution of the
underlying loan documents and the default in those loans, there
is no question that Respondent established its prima facie case
and, therefore, was entitled to judgment.

Further, the Allyns'

attempt to disclaim personal liability based on an alleged oral
side agreement is not disclosed on the face of any of the loan
documents or other evidence submitted by Respondent in support of
its motion.

Thus, in the absence of some counteraffidavit or

other admissible evidence establishing this alleged agreement,
Judge Hanson properly concluded that Interlake was entitled to
summary judgment.

As is shown below, even if Judge Hanson had

allowed the Allyns to submit their opposing memorandum and its
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supporting counter affidavit of Douglas Allyn, the affidavit was
still inadmissible.

B.

Appellants Pytrppytefl Eyiflenge in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion was Inadmissible.

Rule 56(e) requires that evidence, including
counteraffidavits, be admissible before it is admitted in
opposition to a motion.

It is well established that an affidavit

in opposition to a motion is admissible only where it is made on
personal knowledge, its contents would be admissible in evidence,
and the affiant is competent to testify.
748.

Trelocrgen, 699 P. 2d at

It is equally well established that an affidavit setting

forth inadmissible parole evidence used for the purpose of
varying the terms of a written agreement is inadmissible in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment.
Ryttincr. 451 P. 2d 769, 771 (Utah 1969).

Rainford v.

Moreover, self-serving

answers to interrogatories which set forth hearsay and
conclusions are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.
A & M Enterprises. Inc. v. Hunziker. 482 P. 2d 700, 701-702 (Utah
1971).
Appellants contend that the Affidavit of Douglas Allyn,
and their own unverified admissions raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding their personal liability on the subject
loan documents.

To the contrary, this purported evidence was not

-14G:\WPL\159\OOOOOG3X.W51

admissible and, t h e r e f o r e , did not r a i s e an i s s u e of f a c t
precluding entry of summary judgment below.
1.

Tfre AJLlyng' ymygrifiefl flflmiggipng qiq npt

gpngUtvt? »qmi?sj.i?iQ eyiqenpQt
As a preliminary matter, the Allyns did not offer their
admissions in opposition to the motion.

Although Interlake did

introduce certain of Appellants' admissions in support of its
motion, and those admissions were admissible in evidence as party
admissions, the Allyns did not and could not have used their
unverified admissions as evidence against the motion.

Thorp

Sfrlgg Corporation yt pplgge, 453 F. Supp. 196, 202 (W. D. Okla.
1978) ("It is only when the admission is offered against the
party who made it that it comes within the exception of the
hearsay rule for admissions of a party opponent.").

Accordingly,

Rule 56(e)'s requirement that admissible evidence be offered in
opposition to a motion was not satisfied.
Plaintiffs rely on p^<?g yt gpytfrgyp Exprggg Qp. , 409
F. 2d 331 (7th Cir. 1969) for the proposition that a party may use
its own admissions to support or oppose a motion for summary
judgment.

However, the facts in Pace are readily distinguishable

from those of the instant action.

In Pace, the defendant moved

for summary judgment based on the pleadings, the answers to
plaintiff s requests for admissions, and the defendants'
deposition.

The plaintiff did not ever respond to the
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defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Four months later, the

plaintiff moved to dismiss her complaint without prejudice.

The

court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied
plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice on the grounds
that "under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
to avoid summary judgment it was incumbent upon plaintiff to file
affidavits or other materials supporting the allegations of the
complaint. "

!£. at 334.

In reality, Pace stands for competent

authority for the proposition that admissible evidence must be
introduced to contest a motion for summary judgment.

The

decision was based more upon the plaintiff s failure to respond
than upon the competency of evidence asserted by the defendant.
Unlike the defendants in the instant action, the
defendants in Pace at least offered the proposed admissions,
pleadings and depositions to the Court.

In the case at bar,

Judges Hanson and Rokich had no way of knowing that the
defendants relied upon their own unverified admissions as grounds
for contesting plaintiffs motion.

In any event, as discussed

above such unverified admissions would be inadmissible to contest
plaintiffs motion.

2.

The Mfiflfrvit of PowgXas Keirt hllyn

ws

The only evidence which actually was offered in either
case was Douglas Allyn' s affidavit which was offered in the case
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before Judge Rokich.

Interlake argued, however, that this

affidavit lacked adequate foundation for admission, and, further,
was barred by the parole evidence rule.

The Allyns now contend,

as they did below, that under the rationale of Union Bank v.
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Allyn affidavit is not
barred by the parole evidence rule and creates a genuine issue of
fact.
Appellants' reliance on Union Bank is entirely
misplaced.

In that case, the appellants signed a promissory note

both individually and personally.

In addition, one of the

appellants executed the note as president of a corporation.

Upon

default of the note, the lenders sought enforcement against the
corporation and the appellants individually.
In opposition to a motion for summary judgment,
appellants timely offered separate affidavits opposing the motion
in which they stated that a bank officer had informed them that
their signatures were needed to satisfy the bank auditors and the
bank' s loan committee.

They further alleged that this bank

representative assured them that they would not be personally
liable and that without such assurances they would not have
signed the note.

Ifl. at 664.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court' s decision
granting summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.

The remand called for the lower
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court to first make a determination regarding integration of the
contract in light of the appellants' affidavits.

Once the court

determined that there was an integrated contract, it next would
have to consider whether the appellants had established a
question of material fact relative to their theory of fraudulent
inducement.

Id. at 666-667.

In contrast, the Appellants here offered a single,
untimely affidavit that lacks the requisite foundation for
admission into evidence.

The affidavit of Douglas Kent Allyn

contains several fatal flaws.

First, although the affidavit

purports in paragraph 1 to be made upon personal knowledge, the
specific allegations contained in paragraph 2, relied upon by
Douglas Allyn to contest Interlake' s motion for summary judgment,
are true only to "the best of affiant's understanding and
knowledge. '• This qualification allows affiant to make certain
assertions based on his understanding of the facts rather than
his personal knowledge.

Interlake is left to guess which

assertions, if any, are actually based on Mr. Allyn' s personal
knowledge as opposed to his mere understanding.

Clearly, the

limiting phrase prevents the affidavit from complying with the
requirement that affidavits in opposition must be made upon
personal knowledge.

JSfifi Maiorana v. MacDonald. 596 F. 2d 1072,

1080 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Dibble. 429 F. 2d 598, 601-
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602 (9th Cir. 1970); Carev v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E. D.
Penn. 1980).
The affidavit itself provides no clues as to the
affiant' s personal knowledge.

The affidavit makes vague

references to "conversations with Perkins" but fails to specify
when such conversations were held, who was present (or even if
the affiant was present), or specifically what was said.

The

affidavit fails to indicate whether the assurances allegedly made
by Jeff Perkins were made directly to the affiant or through an
intermediary based on Mr. Allyn' s understanding.
Second, even assuming the affidavit was based upon the
personal knowledge of Douglas Allyn, the affidavit does not
purport to address any representations made by Interlake or Mr.
Perkins to the other defendants and, consequently, the other
defendants would remain fully subject to Interlake's motion for
summary judgment.

The affidavit fails to indicate whether Mr.

Perkins made assurances to the other defendants and, in any
event, Mr. Allyn would be incapable of testifying about the other
de fendants' moti vati ons.
Third, the affidavit does not even set forth the
requisite elements of a claim of fraudulent inducement.

It does

not, for example, allege that Mr. Allyn would not have executed
the notes but for the alleged representations of Interlake' s loan
officer, or that Mr. Allyn' s reliance, if any, on these
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representations was justifiable in light of the plain and
unambiguous terms of the notes.

In short, the affidavit of

Douglas Allyn fails as admissible evidence because (1) the facts
in the affidavit were not asserted as based on personal
knowledge, (2) the affidavit's allegations are vague and without
foundation, and (3) the parole evidence rule bars the affidavit's
admission in light of the affiant' s failure to assert fraudulent
inducement.
Significantly, the Allyns made absolutely no effort
during the pendency of this action to take the deposition of the
so-called agent of Interlake who allegedly entered into the oral
agreement regarding no personal liability with Appellants, nor
did the Allyns conduct any other discovery on this issue.
Finally, Judge Rokich was free to disregard Allyn' s
affidavit if he found it inherently unbelievable.

Since the

material facts asserted in Interlake' s memorandum were
uncontested, the loan documents are clear and unambiguous on
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their face and have absolutely no nonrecourse provisions, the
corporation on whose behalf Allyn purportedly signed the
documents never existed, and the Appellants had ample opportunity
to conduct to discovery to produce confirmatory evidence which
they failed to produce, it clearly was not error for Judge Rokich
to conclude that Allyn' s affidavit did not rebut the presumptive
validity and integration of the loan documents nor did it raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding some disingenuous and
self-serving claim of fraudulent inducement.
This case is also distinguishable from Union Bank in
that Douglas Allyn signed multiple agreements in his individual
capacity, not one of which is nonrecourse in the event of
default.

Moreover, Mr. Allyn has contended that he signed in

behalf of a corporation whose name and reference to which appears
nowhere on the note.

Thus, if Appellant' s disingenuous claim is

accepted as true, there is no party liable on the note.
More importantly, there was no evidence offered by
Appellants to prove the very existence of the corporation on
whose behalf Allyn purportedly signed the note.

Consequently,

even if Allyn did also sign in a representative capacity as he
claims in his affidavit, since the note makes absolutely no
reference to that fact and the corporation on whose behalf he
allegedly signed has never existed, Allyn would still be
personally liable on the note.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403(2)(a)
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(1980) (an authorized representative that signs in his own name
"is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the
person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a
representative capacity . . . ." ).
It is equally well established that where a corporation
is never incorporated, or defectively incorporated, persons who
execute contracts on behalf of the corporation are personally
liable for the debts and obligations reflected by those
agreements.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 (1980); Gillham

Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson. 567 P. 2d 163, 165 (Utah 1977).
Mr. Allyn signed the relevant Notes twice.

Once in an

individual capacity and once as the representative for a
corporation that did not exist.

Even assuming arguendo that Mr.

Allyn was fraudulently induced to sign personally through the
representations of Mr. Perkins, there is absolutely no evidence
that Mr. Allyn did not fully intend for the supposed corporation
to be liable.

Because the supposed corporation was defective,

Mr. Allyn is personally liable on the Notes based on his
representative signature, regardless of any representations that
may have been made to induce his personal signature through
assurances that he would not actually be liable based upon his
pers onal s i gnature.
These significant distinctions from Union Bank compel a
different result here.

The single flawed affidavit of Douglas
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Allyn combined with the Allyns' signatures in dual capacities on
the lone documents mandate that the parole evidence rule apply to
disqualify the statements made by Mr. Allyn that contradict the
written documents.

Consequently, the affidavit of Douglas Allyn

was clearly inadmissible for all of the above stated reasons.

The Allyns failed to produce any admissible evidence in
opposition to Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Judge

Hanson was within his discretion to disallow the submission of
the Allyns' late-filed memorandum in opposition and affidavit of
Douglas Allyn.

Neither the affidavit of Douglas Allyn based on

his "understanding and knowledge" nor the unverified, unoffered
admissions of the Allyns qualify as admissible evidence.
Because Interlake presented a prima facie case to
support its Motion for Summary Judgment which was not overcome by
any admissible evidence submitted by the Allyns, the lower
courts' grant of summary judgment was appropriately granted.
Therefore, Interlake respectfully requests that the Allyns appeal
be dismissed, that the lower courts' grant of summary judgment be
affirmed, and that Interlake be awarded its costs associated with
defending against this appeal.
Respectfully submitted.
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DATED this 24th day of October, 1990.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Joltn A. /^Anders o%
Doug Thomas
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion was mailed, postage prepaid, this

2-<f

day of

October, 1990, to the following:
John Burton Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & DUNN
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, "IJtah 84121

AJa^A^ £ , /^L
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson. Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6724
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK an individual,
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN, and
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR.,
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a
Partnership; all dba Parkway
Village, a Joint Venture,

Civil No. C86-6725
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

EXHIBIT A

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") submits the following
points and authorities in support of its motions for summary
judgment and default judgment.
INTRODUCTION
These are consolidated foreclosure actions relating to
certain real property situated at approximately 1700 South 1000
West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Plaintiff is the

beneficiary under certain trust deeds encumbering this real
property.

Defendants are the makers of certain Promissory

Notes giving rise to the Trust Deeds, and also the trustors
pursuant to said Trust Deeds.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake

Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") is a Utah corporation
where its principal place of business is in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Grant Thornton is the court appointed liquidator/

receiver of USA Financial Corporation.
2.

(Aff. of C. Davis 11 3.)

Defendant John B. Swank, whose default was entered

in this consolidated action by the Clerk of this Court on
February 23, 1989, is a resident of the State of California.
3.

Defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John

Allyn, Sr., are residents of the State of California.

Allyn

and Company is a California general partnership consisting of
Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr.
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(Answer to

Complaint C86-6724 at H 3 and Answer to Complaint C86-6725 at
11 3.)
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141 and 9141
4.

On or about May 29, 1985, defendants Douglas Allyn

and Richard Allyn executed that certain Promissory Note in the
principal amount of Two Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred and
No/100 Dollars ($208,500.00) payable to Interlake Thrift, a
true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to
Complaint C86-6724.

The Allyns executed this Promissory Note

both individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company, a
California general partnership.

(Exhibit "A" to Complaint

C86-6724; Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request
Nos. 1 through 4.)
5.

The subject Promissory Note was also executed in

behalf of John B. Swank, as a partner in Parkway Village, a
joint venture involving Swank, the Allyns, and Allyn and
Company.

(Amended Response, to Request for Admissions, Request

No. 5.)
6.

As security for the Promissory Note, on or about

May, 1985, Richard Allyn also executed that certain Deed of
Trust with Assignment of Rents, a true and correct copy of
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B,M
encumbering certain real property situated in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, which is more particularly described therein.
This Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
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Office on October 10, 1985 as Entry No. 4149379 at Book 5699,
Page 619.

Allyn executed this Deed of Trust in behalf of the

defendants and also in behalf of Parkway Village.

(Amended

Response to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 6 through 8.)
7.

On June 10, 1985, Douglas Allyn executed that

certain Additional Funds Agreement, a true and correct copy
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "C," in the
principal amount of Twenty-Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($25,000.00).

Douglas Allyn executed this Additional Funds

Agreement in behalf of himself, Richard Allyn, Allyn and
Company and Parkway Village.

(Amended Response to Request for

Admissions, Request Nos. 9 through 12.)
8.

On or about September 23, 1985, Richard Allyn

executed that certain Additional Funds Agreement, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as
Exhibit M D, M in the principal amount of Sixty-Two Thousand Five
Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($62,500.00).

Allyn executed this

second Additional Funds Agreement for and in behalf of himself,
Douglas Allyn, Allyn and Company, and Parkway Village.
(Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 13
through 15.)
9.

On February 13, 1986, Douglas Allyn executed that

certain Renewal Agreement, a true and correct copy of which is
attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "E," renewing loan
L100141 for the period stated therein.
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Douglas Allyn executed

this Renewal Agreement in behalf the defendants and Parkway
Village.

(Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request

Nos. 16 through 18. )
10.

On November 29, 1985, Richard Allyn and Douglas

Allyn executed that certain Renewal Agreement, both
individually and as partners in Allyn and Company, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as
Exhibit MF."

(Amended Response to Request for Admissions,

Requests Nos. 19 through 26.)
11.

On March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and Richard

Allyn, both individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company,
executed a second Promissory Note in the principal amount of
One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($135,000.00) payable to Interlake Thrift.

A true and correct

copy of this second Promissory Note is attached to Complaint
C86-6724 as Exhibit "G."
12.

As security for this second Promissory Note, on

March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and Richard Allyn, both
individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company, executed that
certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as
Exhibit "H," encumbering certain real property situated in Salt:
Lake County, State of Utah which is more particularly described
therein.

This second Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake

County Recorder's Office on May 21, 1986 as Entry No. 4248675
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at Book 5769, Page 1122.

This second Deed of Trust encumbers

the same real property encumbered by the original Deed of Trust
described in Paragraph 6 above.
13.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 11 10.)

The proceeds from this second Promissory Note

were used to pay down the amount owed by defendants1 pursuant
to the original Promissory Noted dated May 29, 1985.

(Aff. of

C. Davis at U 9.)
14.

Defendants failed to make payments according to

the requirements of the original Promissory Note and Renewal
Agreements attached as Exhibits A, C, D, E and F to Complaint
C86-6724, and are in default thereunder.

(Amended Response to

Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 63 through 65; Aff. of C.
Davis at 1F 11. )
15.

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the first Promissory Note was Three Hundred Forty-Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Two and 73/100 Dollars
($347,652.73), consisting of $223,967.89 in principal and
$123,684.84 in accrued interest.
16.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 11 12.)

The principal amount due on the first Promissory

Note includes the original loan amount, less the pay down
resulting from the second loan, plus interest which had accrued
to and including December 31. 1987.

The separate accrued

interest figure reflects interest which has accrued from
January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum (rather than
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the penalty rate of 18%). The per diem rate on this Promissory
Note is $79.77.
17.

(Aff. of C. Davis at IT 13.)

Defendants also failed to make payments according

to requirements of the second Promissory Note (Exhibit T ) ,
and are in default thereunder.
18.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 11 14.)

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due on the

second Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 was One Hundred
Ninety-Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty and 83/100 Dollars
($194,760.83), consisting of $144,484.27 principal and
$50,276.56 in accrued interest.

The per diem rate on this

second Promissory Note is $51.46.
19.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 1T 15.)

The principal amount due on the second Promissory

Note reflects the original amount of the loan plus accrued
interest to and including December 31, 1987.

The separate

accrued interest figure reflects interest which has accrued
from January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum (rather
than the penalty rate of 18%). (Aff. of C. Davis at U 16.)
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100142 and 9142
20.

On May 29, 1985, Defendant John B. Swank executed

a Promissory Note in the principal amount of Four Hundred
Twelve Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($412,000.00) payable to
Interlake Thrift, a true and correct copy of which is attached
to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "A."
11 17.)
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(Aff. of C. Davis at

21.

As security for this loan, on or about May 29,

1985, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents, a true and correct copy of whi

is

attached to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "B," encumbering
certain real property situated at approximately 1700 South 1000
West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which is more
particularly described therein.

This Trust Deed was recorded

in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on October 10, 1985
as Entry No. 4149377 at Book 5899, Page 612.

This Deed of

Trust encumbers property adjacent to that covered by the Allyn
Deeds of Trust.
22.

(Aff. of C. Davis at H 18.)

Swank executed a Renewal Agreement, a true and

correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6725 as
Exhibit "C," extending the payment date on the original
Promissory Note to July 15, 1986 on the conditions set forth
therein.

(Aff. of C. Davis at If 19.)
23.

On March 31, 1986, Swank executed a second

Promissory Note, a true and correct copy of which is attached
to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit M D, H payable to Interlake
Thrift in the principal amount of Forty-Three Thousand and
No/100 Dollars ($43,000.00).
24.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 1T 20.)

The Second Promissory Note in the principal

amount of Forty-Three Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($43,000.00)
was used to a pay down the original Promissory Note of May 29,
1985.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 1T 20.)
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25.

As security for this second Promissory Note, on

March 31, 1986, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust
with Assignment of Rents, a true and correct copy of which is
attached to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "E," encumbering the
same real property encumbered by the original Deed of Trust
dated May 29, 1985.

This second Trust Deed was recorded in the

Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on July 15, 1985 as Entry
No. 4278658 at Book 5790, Page 2068.

(Aff. of C. Davis at

11 21.)
26.

Defendants failed to make payments according to

the requirements of the first Promissory Note dated May 29,
1985 in the principal amount of $412,000.00 and are in default
thereunder.
27.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 11 22.)
As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Exhibit "A" to
Complaint C86-6725) was Six Hundred Thirty Thousand Two Hundred
Thirty-Eight and 58/100 Dollars ($630,238.58), consisting of
$467,554.88 in principal together with accrued interest of
$162,683.70.
28.

(Aff. of C. Davis at 11 23.)
The principal amount of the first Promissory Note

includes the original loan amount, less the pay down, together
with accrued interest to and including December 31, 1987.

The

separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has
accrued from January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum
(rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum).
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The per diem

rate of interest on the first Promissory Note is $166.53.
(Aff. of C. Davis at U 24.)
29.

Defendants also failed to make payments according

to the requirements of the second Promissory Note date March
31, 1986 (Exhibit "EM to Complaint C86-6725), and are in
default thereunder.
30.

(Aff. of C. Davis at IT 25.)

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the second Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 (Exhibit "DM
to Complaint C86-6725) was Sixty-One Thousand Five Hundred
Eighty and 81/100 Dollars ($61,580.81), consisting of principal
in the amount of $45,684.06 together with accrued interest of
$15,896.75.
31.

(Aff. of C. Davis at H 26.)
The principal amount due on the second Promissory

Note includes the original loan amount together with accrued
interest to and including December 31, 1987.

The separate

accrued interest figure reflects interest which has accrued
since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum
(rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum).

The per diem

rate of interest on the second Promissory Note is $16.27.
(Aff. of C. Davis at IT 27.)
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT JOHN SWANK.
Defendant John Swank's default was taken pursuant to

Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Pursuant to Rule

55(b), Interlake is entitled to a default judgment against
Swank adjudging the total amount due and owing by him to
Interlake on Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100142 and 9142 in the
total amount of $61,819.39, together with costs, attorneys'
fees and interest which it continues to accrue pursuant to the
Promissory Notes at the rate of at lease 13% per annum.
Interlake is further entitled to an order directing
the sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy said amount and
all accrued and accruing costs and interest, and directing the
sheriff to proceed to sell the same according to the provisions
of law relating to sales on execution, and also to a special
execution order of sale to be issued for that purpose pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 et seq.
In the event the proceeds from the sale of the trust
deed property are insufficient, and a balance still remains
due, a deficiency judgment must also be docketed by the Clerk
in the amount of the deficiency and a writ of execution issued
for such balance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-2.
II.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS DOUGLAS ALLYN, RICHARD ALLYN, AND ALLYN AND
COMPANY.
Plaintiff is also entitled pursuant to Rule 56(c) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to a judgment against
defendants Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn, and Allyn and Company
on Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141 and 9141.

There are no

disputed issues of material fact with respect to the execution

-11-

of said notes or the security agreements encumbering the Trust
Deed property.

Further, there is no dispute regarding

defendants* default under both of these Parkway Village Notes,
or with respect to the present amounts of the obligations
secured by the Trust Deed property.

Accordingly, summary

judgment should be granted to plaintiff because it is clear
from these undisputed facts that the defendants cannot prevail
as a matter of law and that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the Allyns
and Allyn and Company adjudging the amount due under Parkway
Village Loan Nos. L100141 dated May 29, 1985 and the Additional
Funds Agreements dated June 10, 1985 and September 23, 1985 in
the total amount of $347,652.73, together with costs,
attorneys' fees and accrued interest.

Plaintiff is also

entitled to an order directing the sale of the Trust Deed
property to satisfy said amount, and directing the sheriff to
proceed to sell the same according to the provisions of law
relating to sales on execution, and to a special execution
order of sale for that purpose pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-37-1.

In the event the proceeds from the sale are

insufficient to satisfy this judgment, and a balance still
remains due, a deficiency judgment must thereafter be docketed
by the Clerk in the amount of the deficiency and a writ of
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execution issued for such balance pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-37-2.
Plaintiff is also entitled to a judgment against the
Allyns and Allyn and Company adjudging the amount due under
Parkway Village Loan No. 9141 dated March 31, 1986 in the
amount of $242,773.15, together with costs, attorneys' fees and
accrued interest.

Plaintiff is also entitled to an order

directing the sale of the trust deed property to satisfy said
amount and directing the sheriff to proceed to sell the same
according to the provisions of law relating to sales on
execution, and to a special execution order of sale for that
purpose pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1.

In the event the

proceeds from this sale are insufficient to satisfy this
judgment, and a balance still remains due, a deficiency
judgment must thereafter be docketed by the Clerk and a writ of
execution issued for such balance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-37-2.
III.

PLAINTIFF'S LIENS AGAINST THE TRUST DEED PROPERTY ARE
SENIOR AND SUPERIOR TO ANY OTHER LIENS.
Finally, there are no persons holding a conveyance

from or under the mortgagor of the subject property, or having
a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien appeared of record at
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office at the time this action
was commenced and, therefore, plaintiff is also entitled to an
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-2REQOBST NO. 2:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by Defendant Richard John Allyn,
Sr. on or about May 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and

Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf
of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:
Company
project.

to obtain

Admit that Defendants signed for Allyn and
funding

to complete the Parkway Village

According to Jeff Perkins, Interlake could not lend

Swank more money because Swank's loan amount would then exceed
it's legal limits.

Interlake needed to make part of the loan

to another company.

Allyn and Company consented to signing for

part of the loan after receiving assurances from Perkins that
Richard J. Allyn and Douglas Kent Allyn would not be personally
liable and that if there was a problem Interlake would simply
take the property back without any personal liability.

Douglas

Kent Allyn and John Swank were working together on the Parkway
Village project.
REQUEST NO. 4:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and

Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf
of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

-3REQOBST NO. 5:

Admit that John 3. Swank was a

partner in Parkway Village, a joint venture, along with Douglas
Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn was working

with John B. Swank on a retainer basis with the anticipation
that Allyn would receive a certain percentage of the Parkway
Village project once it was put together.
REQUEST NO. 6:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rights executed by
Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about May 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 7:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.,

executed said Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 8:
executed

said

Exhibit

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.,

"B" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

Admit, see paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 9:

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit

M

C n is a true and correct copy

of an Additional Funds Agreement executed
Allyn on or about June 10, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

by Douglas Kent

-4R2QUBST NO* 10: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 a Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of
an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard John Allyn,
Sr, on or about June 10/ 1985.
ANSWER: Admit that Exhibit "C" is a true and correct
copy, but deny execution of document by Richard J. Allyn.
Douglas Kent Allyn is the one who actually executed the document
for Richard J. Allyn.
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in
behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn signed for

Richard J. Allyn for Allyn & Company.

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in
behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 11 above.

REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy
of an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard Jonn
Allyn, Sr. on or about September 23, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed said Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

-5RBQUEST HO. 15s Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed

said

Exhibit

"D" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO* 16s

Admit that the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement

executed

by Douglas Kent Allyn on

February 13, 1986.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST

NO. 17:

Admit

that

Douglas Kent Allyn

executed said Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 18:
executed

said

Exhibit

M

Admit

E" for and

that Douglas Kent Allyn
in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 19:

Admit the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr.
on or about November 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 20:

Admit the document attached to

Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or
about November 29, 1985.

-6ANSWERs

Admit

REQUEST HO, 21:
executed

said

Exhibit

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

"F" for and

in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 22:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 23:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.,

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

Deny.

Although the document shows signing

as an individual, Defendant was signing for the partnership.
According to Jeff Perkins, there was to be no personal liability
of the Defendants.
REQUEST NO. 24:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWERS

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 25:

Admit

that

Douglas

Kent Allyn

executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 3 above.

REQUEST NO. 26:

Admit

that

Douglas Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit HF" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 23 above*

REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy

-7of a Promissory Note executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or
about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

Defendants do not recall this document and

therefore deny.
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or
about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 29:
executed

said

Exhibit

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

"G" for and in behalf of Allyn and

Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 30:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

executed said Exhibit "Gn for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 31:

Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.

executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

32: Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

-8REQUBST

NO.

34: Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment

of Rents executed by

Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 36: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment

of Rents executed by

Douglas Kent Allyn on or about March 31, 1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST MO. 37: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWERS

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 39: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr.
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWERS

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

40: Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and
Company.

Allyn

-9AMSWBRi

See paragraph 27 above,

REQUEST

NO.

41: Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST

NO.

42: Admit

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

executed said Exhibit M H" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above,

REQUEST NO. 43: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about May
29, 1985.
ANSWERt

Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn was present

when many of the documents were signed by John B. Swank and to
the best of his recollection admits that Mr. Swank executed
this document.
REQUEST

HO.

44: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "A" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWERS

Deny.

Originally, the purchaser of the

Parkway Property was to be in a corporate name or Swanks name.
Jeff Perkins indicated, however, that the Plaintiff could not
do that because the loan amount would exceed its legal limit.
As explained in paragraph 3 above, Allyn and Company signed on
the previous documents responded to.

Swank, however, was not

authorized to sign for Allyn and Company, Douglas Kent Allyn
or Richard J. Allyn.

-10RBQUEST NO. 45: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit
"A" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

Defendant can only speculate Mr. Swank's

intent and therefore denies, letting the document speak for
itself.

See also paragraph 44 above.
REQUEST NO. 46: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit

"A" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 47: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John
B. Swank on or about May 29, 1985.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST

NO.

48: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a/ Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST NO. 49: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 4 5 above.

REQUEST NO. 50: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 51: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy
of a Renewal Agreement executed by John B. Swank.

-11ANSWER:

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST NO.

52: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "C" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST

NO.

53: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "C" for and in behalf of himself.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 54: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 55: Admit that the document attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about
March 31, 1986.
ANSWERS

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST

NO.

56: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Richard John Allyn, Sr. and
Douglas Kent Allyn, d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWERS

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST NO. 57: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWERS

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST

NO.

58: Admit

that

Exhibit "D" for in behalf of himself.

Swank

executed

said

-12ANSWSI:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST NO. 59: Admit that the documents attached to
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John
B. Swank on or about March 31, 1986•
ANSWER:

See paragraph 43 above.

REQUEST NO. 60: Admit

that Swank executed

said

Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST

NO.

61: Admit

that

Swank

executed

said

executed

said

Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Parkway Village.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 45 above.

REQUEST

NO.

62: Admit

that

Swank

Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Allyn and Company.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 44 above.

REQUEST NO. 63: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to the

requirements

of

Exhibit

"A" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 64: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments

according

to the

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

requirements

of

Exhibit

"C" to

-13-

RBQUBST NO. 65: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments according

to the requirements of Exhibit

"D" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 66: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments according

to the requirements of Exhibit "G" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 27 above.

REQUEST NO. 67: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments according

to the requirements of Exhibit "A" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 68: Admit that Defendants failed to make
payments according

to the requirements of Exhibit "D" to

Complaint C86-6724.
ANSWER:

Admit

DATED this J:J*

day of June, 1988,

erson
for Defendants

^X

CERTIFICATE OF HANS-DELIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Response to Requests for
Admissions were -haad- delivered on the VV'" day of June, 1988,
- / / «.«* «.... v. v. .

to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 6 MCCARTHY at
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt/Lake City, UtaX 84145.
/

/

VAN COTT, BAGLEY. CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN A. ANDERSON

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6724
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK an individual,
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN, and
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR.,
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a
Partnership: all dba Parkway
Village, a Joint Venture,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-6725
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

John A. Anderson, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah, over the age

of 18, and otherwise competent to make this affidavit.

Except

those matters stated on information and belief, which I believe
to be true, the matters set forth below are based on my
personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and
would competently testify thereto.
2.

I am a shareholder in the law firm of Van Cott,

Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott,f) in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar and

I am qualified to practice before all courts of the State of
Utah.
3.

Van Cott has been retained by Grant Thornton, the

court appointed receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial
Corporation dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division
("Interlake") to prosecute the present action.

I am the

attorney now primarily responsible for the prosecution of said
action.

In such capacity, I am familiar with the costs which

have been advanced and the attorneys' fees charged, and to be
charged in collecting the amounts due under the subject
Promissory Notes and in foreclosing the subject Trust Deeds by
Van Cott.
-2-

4.

The plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees is

based on the express terms of the Promissory Notes and Trust
Deeds which are part of Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141,
L100142, 941, and 942, and which are described in greater
detail in the accompanying memorandum of points and
authorities.

Each of these Notes and Trust Deeds provides for

the payment of costs and attorneys' fees upon default in the
terms thereof.
5.

The attorneys' fees which plaintiff has incurred

for services through November 1, 1989 in collecting the amounts
due under the subject Promissory Notes and foreclosing the
subject Trust Deeds is $9,942.50, based on 102.00 hours of work
by the following attorneys:
Patricia Olsen
Patricia Olsen
Thomas T. Billings
Thomas T. Billings
John A. Anderson

17.00
14.00
3.00
3.50
26.00

hours
hours
hours
hours
hours

at $80.00 per hour
at $85.00 per hour
at $130.00 per hour
at $140.00 per hour
at $95.00 per hour

John A. Anderson

38.50 hours

at $105.00 per hour

These hourly rates are below the normal hourly rate charged by
attorneys at Van Cott and are reasonable fees for comparable
legal services.
6.

These services represent time spent in

investigation of facts, legal research, drafting of the
Complaint, discovery matters, preparation of the motion for
summary judgment and related pleadings, interoffice
conferences, conferences with Grant Thornton and its

-3-

representatives, preparation of correspondence and telephone
conferences with plaintiff, third parties and opposing counsel,
and protection of the Trust Deed Property.
7.

Assuming that those services are required beyond

final preparation of the motion for summary judgment after
November 1, 1989, responding to defendants' opposition to said
motion, if any, appearing and arguing the motion, preparing the
appropriate order and documents relating to the sale of
collateral and attending the sheriff's sale, the additional
attorneys' fees to be charged to plaintiff will be
approximately $2,000.00.
8.

All of said services rendered or to be rendered by

Van Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary
in the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise germane to this
action.
DATED t h i s

day of November. A 8 8 9 .

lerson

-4-

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me
this \Q\IT\ day of November, 1989, by John A. Anderson.

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at: fj^U^d
My Commission Expires

-5-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of John A. Anderson to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this fl>W day of

^^•dt^^ y ^^ ,

1989, to the following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92

7007A
110389
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRIS DAVIS

)
)

JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. C86-6724
Honorable Timothy R. Hansoi

USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK an individual,
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN, and
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR.,
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a
Partnership; all dba Parkway
Village, a Joint Venture,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-6725
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Chris Davis, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, over the age of 18, and otherwise competent to make this
affidavit.

Except those matters stated on information and

belief, which I believe to be true, the matters set forth below
are based on my personal knowledge, and if called as a witness,
I could and would competently testify thereto.
2.

I was employed by Interlake Thrift as the Office

Manager of the Mortgage Division from approximately January,
1983 to June, 1985.

In that capacity, I familiarized myself

with the business records of Interlake Thrift, including the
records maintained by Interlake Thrift in the regular and
ordinary course of its business relating to loan transactions
such as those at issue in the present lawsuit.
3.

On July 1, 1987, Grant Thornton was appointed as

the receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial Corporation,
dba Interlake Thrift -' Mortgage Division.
4.

I have been employed as Operations Manager of

Interim* Thrift from kv^ust, VJ&7 to the preset.

IY\ that

capacity, I have access to and am familiar with the business
records of Interlake Thrift which it has maintained in the
regular and ordinary course of its business to reflect loan
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transactions such as those at issue in the present lawsuit.

My

job responsibilities include, among other things, supervision
and collection of Interlake Thrift's delinquent loan accounts.
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141 and 9141
5.

I have reviewed and am personally familiar with

Interlake Thrift's records concerning Loan No. L100141, which
relates to that certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 in
the principal amount of Two Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred
and No/100 Dollars ($208,500.00) payable to Interlake Thrift by
Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn and/or Allyn and Company, a true
and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to
Complaint C86-6724.

The records of Interlake Thrift reflect

that this loan amount was disbursed to or for the benefit of
the makers, Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn and/or Allyn and
Company, a California general partnership, on or about May 29,
1985.
6.

As security for this Promissory Note, on or about

May 29, 1985• Richard Allyn also executed that certain Deed of
Trust, a true and correct copy of which is attached to
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B,M encumbering certain real
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which is
more particularly described therein.

This property is commonly

referred to as Parkway Village, 1092 and 1093 Gamble Place.
7.

Interlake Thrift Loan No. L100141 also includes

funds disbursed on or about June 10, 1985 pursuant to that
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certain Additional Funds Agreement in the principal amount of
$25,000 payable to Interlake Thrift, a true and correct copy of
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "C."
Interlake Thrift's records reflect that the full amount of
these additional funds was disbursed to or for the benefit of
defendants on or about June 10, 1985.
8.

Interlake Thrift Loan No. L100141 also includes

funds disbursed on or about September 23, 1985 pursuant to that
certain Additional Funds Agreement in the principal amount of
$62,500 payable to Interlake Thrift, a true and correct copy of
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "D."
Interlake Thrift's records reflect that the full amount of
these additional funds was disbursed to or for the benefit of
defendants on or about September 23, 1985.
9.

On or about March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and

Richard Allyn, both individually and in behalf of Allyn and
Company, executed a second Promissory Note in the principal
arount of $135,000.00 payable to Interlake Thrift, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to complaint C86-6724 as
Exhibit "G."

Interlake Thrifts' records reflect that this

second loan was used to pay down the then current balance of
Interlake Thrift Loan No. L100141.

This second loan generated

a separate accounting under Interlake Thrift Loan No. 9141.
10.

As security for the second Promissory Note, on

March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and Richard Allyn, both
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individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company executed that
certain Deed of Trust, a true and correct copy of which is
attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H," encumbering the
Parkway Village property covered by the earlier Deed of Trust
(Exhibit "B").
11.

Defendants have failed to make payments according

to the requirements of the original Promissory Note, Additional
Funds Agreements and Renewal Agreements attached as Exhibits A,
C, D, E and F to Complaint C86-6724, and are in default
thereunder.
12.

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the first Promissory Note was $347,652.73, which includes a
principal balance of $223,967.89 and $123,684.84 in accrued
interest.
13.

The principal amount due on the first Promissory

Note includes the original loan amount and costs, less the pay
down resulting from Loan 9141, together with interest which had
accrued to and including December 31, 1987.

Thereafter,

Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a separate
interest balance was calculated with respect to said Note.

The

separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has
accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% (rather
than the penalty rate of 18% set forth in the Promissory
Note).

The per diem rate on the original Promissory Note is

$79.77.
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14.

Defendants have also failed to make payments

according to the requirements of the second Promissory Note
dated March 31, 1986 (Exhibit "G"), and are in default
thereunder.
15.

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the second Promissory Note was $194,760.83, which includes
the principal balance of $144,484.27 and $50,276.56 in accrued
interest.
16.

The principal amount due on the second Promissory

Note reflects the original amount of the loan and costs
together with accrued interest to and including December 31,
1987.

Thereafter, Interlake Thrift's records were computerized

and a separate interest balance was calculated with respect to
said Note.

The separate accrued interest figure reflects

interest which has accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor
rate of 13% per annum (rather than the penalty rate of 18% per
annum set forth in the Promissory Note).

The per diem rate on

this second Promissory Note is $51.46.
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100142 and 9142
17.

I have also reviewed and am familiar with

Interlake Thrift's records concerning Loan No. L100142, which
relates to that certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 in
the principal amount of $412,000.00 payable to Interlake Thrift
by John Swank.

Interlake Thrift's records reflect that the
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full proceeds of this loan in the amount of $412,000.00 were
disbursed to or for the benefit of John Swank on or about May
29, 1985.
18.

As security for this Promissory Note, on May 29,

1985, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust, a true
and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6725 as
Exhibit "B" encumbering certain real property situated at
approximately 1700 South 1000 West, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, which is more particularly described therein, and which
is commonly known as Parkway Village, 1092 and 1093 Gamble
Place.

This Deed of Trust encumbers real property situated

adjacent to that covered by the Allyn Deeds of Trust described
above.
19.

Swank thereafter executed a Renewal Agreement, a

true and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint
C86-6725 as Exhibit MC,,f extending the payment date on the
original Promissory Note to July 15, 1986 on the condition set
forth therein,
20.

I have also reviewed and familiar with Interlake

Thrift's records concerning Loan No. 9142 which relates to that
certain Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 in the principal
amount of $43,000.00 payable to Interlake Thrift by John Swank,
a true and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint
C86-6725 as Exhibit "D."

Interlake Thrift's records reflect
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that the full amount of this second loan of $43,000.00 was
disbursed for the benefit of John Swank on or about March 31,
1986, and was used as a pay down of the original Promissory
Note of May 29, 1985.
21.

As security for the second Promissory Note, on

March 31, 1986, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust,
a true and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint
C86-6725 as Exhibit "E," encumbering the same Parkway Village
Property identified in Exhibit "B" to Complaint C86-6725.
22.

Defendants have failed to make payments according

to the requirements of the first Promissory Noted dated May 29,
1985 in the principal amount of $412,000.00 and are in default
thereunder.
23.

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Exhibit "A" to
Complaint C86-6725) was $630,238.58, which includes the
principal balance of $467,554.88 and accrued interest of
$162,683.70.
24.

The principal amount of the first Promissory Note

on Loan No. L100142 dated May 29, 1985, includes the original
loan amount and costs, less the pay down, together with accrued
interest to and including December 31, 1987. Thereafter,
Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a separate
interest balance was calcualted with respect to said Note.
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The

separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has
accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per
annum (rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum).

The per

diem rate of interest on the first Promissory Note is $166.55.
25.

Defendants have also failed to make payments

according to the requirements of the second Promissory Note
dated March 31, 1986 (Exhibit "E" to Complaint C86-6725), and
are in default thereunder.
26.

As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing

on the second Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 was
$61,580.41, consisting of principal in the amount of $45,684.06
together with accrued interest of $15,896.75.
27.

The principal amount due on the second Promissory

Note includes the original loan amount and costs together with
accrued interest to and including December 31, 1987.
Thereafter, Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a
separate interest balance was calcualted with respect to said
Note.

The separate accrued interest figure reflects interest

which has accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of
13% per annum (rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum).
The per diem rate on the second Promissory Note is $16.27.
28.

Interlake retained the law firm of Van Cott,

Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott1') to prosecute the
present actions.

The services rendered or to be rendered by
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Van Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary
in the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise related to these
actions.
DATED this

6r

day of November, 1989,

u

V

u,) [\ A^c"

Chris Davis
STATE OF UTAH

ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me
this

/ -" day of November, 1989, by Chris Davis.
/>
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My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of Chris Davis to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this [fl[v\ day of November, 1989, to
the following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020

7004A
102589
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6726
Honorable John A. Rokich

Defendants.

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") submits the following
points and authorities in support of its motions for summary
judgment and default judgment.
INTRODUCTION
This is an action to foreclose two trust deeds
encumbering real property situated at approximately 315 East

300 South in Salt Lake City, Salt County, State of Utah.
Plaintiff Interlake, through its court appointed liquidator/
receiver, Grant Thornton, is the beneficiary and assignee of
the trust deeds encumbering the above-described property.
Defendants are trustors of the subject trust deed property
and/or have assigned security to plaintiff to cover the trust
deed obligations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Grant Thornton is the court appointed liquidator/

receiver of plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake"), a Utah corporation
whose principal place of business is in Salt Lake City, Utah.
(Aff. of C. Davis at IT 2. )
2.

Defendant John B. Swank, whose default was entered

in this case by the Clerk of this Court on February 23, 1989,
is a resident of the State of California.
3.

Defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John

Allyn are residents of the State of California.

The Allyns

engaged in business under the name Allyn and Company, a
California partnership.
4.

(Answer at U 3.)

John B. Swank and Douglas Kent Allyn also did

business under the name J & D Properties, a California
partnership.

(Swank Default; Answer at 11 3.)
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Interlake Thrift Loan
5.

On October 31, 1985, defendants Douglas Kent Allyn

and John B. Swank executed that certain Promissory Note in the
principal amount of Two Hundred and Two Thousand Four Hundred
Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($202,450.00) payable to USA Financial
Corporation, dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division, a true
and correct copy of which is attached to the Complaint as
Exhibit "A."

(Amended Response to Requests for Admission,

Request Nos. 1 and 2.)
6.

As security for this Promissory Note, Douglas

Allyn and John Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust
with Assignment of Rents dated October 31, 1985, encumbering
certain real property situated at approximately 315 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as more
particularly described therein.

A true and correct copy of

this Deed of Trust is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B,"
and was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on
March 7, 1986 as Entry No. 4211971 at Book 5742, Page 2990.
(Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 6 and
7.)
7.

As further security for the Promissory Note,

defendant Douglas Allyn executed an Assignment dated October
31, 1985 in behalf of Allyn and Company, a California
Partnership, assigning to USA Financial Corporation, all of
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Allyn and Company's right, title and interest in and to PRB,
Ltd., a California limited partnership, which consists of an
undivided 16.3636 percentage interest in said limited
partnership.

A true and correct copy of this Assignment, which

was recorded in the official records of Los Angeles County,
California on March 11, 1986, is attached to the Complaint as
Exhibit "C."

(Amended Response to Request for Admissions,

Request Nos. 10 and 11.)
8.

In January, 1986, Douglas Allyn and John Swank

executed a Renewal Agreement, a true and correct copy of which
is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "D."

(Amended Response

to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 14 and 15.)
9.

Defendants Swank and Douglas Allyn have failed to

make payments according to the requirements of the Promissory
Note (Exhibit MA") and are in default thereunder.

(Amended

Response to Request for Admissions, Request No. 22; Aff. of C.
Davis at HIT 5-8. )
10.

As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due and

owing under the Promissory Note was Three Hundred Seventy-One
Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy One and 30/100 Dollars
($371,871.30), which includes a principal balance of
$251,349.69 and accrued interest of $120,521.61.

(Aff. of C.

Davis at IT 9 . )
11.

The principal balance due includes the original

loan amount together with accrued interest from the date of the
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note to and including December 31, 1987.

The accrued interest

figure is calculated from January 1, 1988 at the rate of 18%
per annum.
$123.96.

The per diem charge on this Promissory Note is
(Aff. of C. Davis at 11 10.)
Commerce Financial Loan

12.

On or about November 5, 1985, defendant John

Swank executed a second Promissory Note in the principal amount
of Four Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Nineteen and
64/100 Dollars ($455,419.64) payable to Commerce Financial.

A

true and correct copy of this second Promissory Note is
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "E."

(Amended Response to

Request for Admissions, Request No. 17; Swank Default; Aff. of
C. Davis at 11 11. )
13.

As security for this second Promissory Note,

Swank executed a second Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents
dated November 5, 1985 encumbering the same real property
situated at approximately 315 East 300 South in Salt Lake City,
Utah that was encumbered as security for Interlake Thrift's
loan, and which is more particularly described therein.

A true

and correct copy of this second Deed of Trust is attached to
the Complaint as Exhibit "F."

This second Deed of Trust was

recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on November
6, 1985, as Entry No. 4160854 at Book 5707, Page 793.

(Amended

Response to Requests for Admissions, Request No. 21; Aff. of C.
Davis at 11 12. )
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14.

Commerce Financial declared its Promissory Note

to be in default and initiated foreclosure of the Trust Deed
Property.

On or about July 15, 1986, Commerce Financial

assigned its interest in and to the above-described second
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust to USA Financial Mortgage dba
Interlake Thrift.

A true and correct copy of this Assignment

is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "G.,f

(Aff. of C. Davis

at 1 13. )
15.

Swank has failed to make payments according to

the requirements of this second Promissory Note (Exhibit "E")
and is in default thereunder.

(Swank default; Aff. of C. Davis

at f 15.)
16.

As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due on

the second Promissory Note was Eight Hundred Forty-Three
,<Sl
V

Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Five and 10/100 Dollars
($843,535.10), which includes a principal balance of
$536,421.74 and interest of $307,113.36.

(Aff. of C. Davis at

11 16. )
17.

The principal balance due on the Commerce

Financial Loan includes the original loan amount together with
accrued interest, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by
Commerce Financials in order to collect on this loan to July
15, 1986, at which point the loan was signed to Interlake for a
payment of $513,033.78 representing the then principal balance
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of the loan, including the above stated amounts.

This

principal amount also includes subsequent charges against the
subject property representing payment of delinquent taxes by
Interlake.

The accrued interest figure is calculated from July

15, 1986 at the rate of 18% per annum.
this Promissory Note is $264.54.

The per diem charge on

(Aff. of C. Davis at H 17.)

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF If> ENTITLED TO A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT JOHN SWANK.
Defendant John Swank's default was taken pursuant to

Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to Rule

55(b), Interlake is entitled to a default judgment against
Swank adjudging the total amount due by him to Interlake on the
first and second Promissory Notes above in the total amount of
$1,215,406.40, together with costs, attorneys' fees and
interest which continues to accrue pursuant to the Promissory
Notes at the rate of 18% per annum.

Interlake is further

entitled to an order directing the sale of the mortgaged
property to satisfy said amount and all accured and accruing
costs and interest, and directing the sheriff to proceed to
sell the same according to the provisions of law relating to
sales on execution, and also to a special execution order of
sale to be issued for that purpose pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-37-1 et: seq.

In the event the proceeds from the sale of the trust
deed property are insufficient, and a balance still remains
due, a judgment must also be docketed by the Clerk in the
amount of the deficiency and execution issued for such balance
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2.
II.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS DOUGLAS ALLYN, RICHARD ALLYN, AND ALLYN AND
COMPANY.
Plaintiff is also entitled pursuant to Rule 56(c) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to a judgment against
defendants Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn, and Allyn and Company
on the first Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985.

There are

no disputed issues of fact with respect to the execution of
said Note or the security agreements encumbering the Trust Deed
property and the partnership interest of Allyn and Company in
PRB, Ltd.

Further, there is no dispute regarding defendants'

default under the first Promissory Note, or with respect to the
present amount of the obligations secured by the Trust Deed
property.

Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted to

plaintiff because it is clear from these undisputed facts that
the defendants cannot prevail as a matter of law and that
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the Allyns
and Allyn and Company adjudging the amount due under the first
Promissory Note in the amount of $371,871.30, together with
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costs, attorneys' fees and accrued interest.

Plaintiff is also

entitled to an order directing the sale of the trust deed
property to satisfy said amount, and directing the sheriff to
proceed to sell the same according to the provisions of law
relating to sales on execution, and to a special execution
order of sale for that purpose pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-37-1.

In the event the proceeds from the sale are

insufficient to satisfy this judgment, and a balance still
remains due, a deficiency judgment must thereafter be docketed
by the Clerk and execution may then issue for such balance
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2.
In addition, by reason of defendants' default,
plaintiff is entitled to an order foreclosing the interest of
Allyn and Company in PRB, Ltd., a California limited
partnership, consisting of an undivided 16.3636 percent
interest.

There is no dispute that this limited partnership

interest was assigned to plaintiff as security for defendant's
obligations pursuant to the first Promissory Note.

A judgment

should be entered decreeing that the assignment of the limited
partnership interest was an effective assignment that created a
good and sufficient lien upon Allyn and Company's interest in
said limited partnership in favor of Interlake.
Ann. § 70A-9-102(2), -106, and -201(37).

See Utah Code

Accordingly, the

judgment herein must provide for the foreclosure of the
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above-described security interest in PRB, Ltd. and order the
sale of the interest by the sheriff pursuant to Rule 69(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' LIENS AGAINST THE TRUST DEED PROPERTY ARE
SENIOR AND SUPERIOR TO ANY OTHER LIENS.
Finally, there are no persons holding a conveyance

from or under the mortgagor of the subject property, or having
a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien appeared of record at
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office at the time this action
was commenced and, therefore, plaintiff is also entitled to an
order adjudging its security interest in the subject property
to be superior and senior to the interest of any party holding
a conveyance of the mortgaged property, or having a lien
thereon, and any such party's interest should be foreclosed and
found to be inferior to the plaintiff's interest.
IV.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS.
The Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985 by and

between Interlake Thrift and defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and
John B. Swank provides for the payment of costs and attorneys'
fees upon default by the makers.

Likewise, the Deed of Trust

of even date provides for the payment of costs and attorneys'
fees upon a default in the obligations set forth therein.
Similarly, the Commerce Financial Promissory Note
dated November 5, 1985 provides that attorneys' fees and costs
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are to be paid in the event of a default thereunder.

The Deed

of Trust of even date also provides for the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs upon default.

This Promissory Note

and Trust Deed were later assigned to Interlake, including
Interlake's right to recover the attorneys' fees incurred by
Commerce Financial and Interlake as a result of any default
thereunder.
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an award of its
attorneys' fees which are set forth in greater detail in the
accompanying Affidavit of John A. Anderson.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff is entitled to a
default judgment against John Swank.

Plaintiff is also

entitled to a summary judgment against defendants Douglas
Allyn, Richard Allyn, and Allyn and Company.

Plaintiff is

further entitled to a judgment declaring the seniority and
superiority of its liens against the Trust Deed property.

DATED this jj^L-day of

AJpJ^A^^

1989.

VAN COTT, BAGH&JEtf/j CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

v
John Ar4\rraerson
Att/orneys for P l a i n t i f f
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this jfU day of

/Ud&^&S

1989, to the following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 9

7002A
110389
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINACIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
AMENDED RESPONSE TO
) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
a California Partnership; DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ALLYN,
SR., dba ALLYN AND COMPANY,
a California Partnership,
Defendants.
Come

now,

)
)
Civil No. C86-6726
)
) Honorable John A. Rokich
)
)
)

the

Defendants,

Douglas

Kent

Allyn,

Richard John Allyn, Sr. and Allyn and Company, a California
Partnership and pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

answer

Plaintiff's

First

Set

of

Requests

for

Admissions as follows:
REQUEST NO. 1:

Admit that Exhibit "A" to the Com-

plaint was executed on or about October 31, 1985 by Douglas
Kent Allyn.

-2ANSWER:

Admit to the execution of the Promissory

Note, copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to Complaint with
Civil No- C86-6726.
REQUEST HO. 2:

Admit that Exhibit "A" to the Com-

plaint was executed on or about October 31, 1985 by John 3.
Swank.
ANSWER:

Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn was present

when many of the documents were signed by John B. Swank and to
the best of his recollection admits that John B. Swank executed
this document.
REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent

Allyn were partners in J & D Properties, a California partnership.
ANSWER:

Deny.

J & D Properties, Inc. was supposed

to be a corporation whose corporate status with the State of
Utah was verified by Jeff Perkins.
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn executed
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and as a
partner in J & D Properties.
ANSWER:

Deny.

Douglas Kent Allyn signed as an

officer of J & D Properties, Inc.
REQUEST NO. 5:

Admit that John B. Swank executed

Exhibit "A" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and as a
partner in J & D Properties.

-3ANSWER:

Deny, in as much as these Defendants under-

stood Swank to be signing as an officer of J & D Properties, a
corporation.
REQUEST NO. 6:

Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent

Allyn executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint on or about October
31, 1985.
ANSWER:

Admits to the execution of the trust deed,

a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to Complaint with
Civil No. C86-6726.
REQUEST NO. 7:

Admit that Defendant John B. Swank

executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint on or about October 31,
1985.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 2 above.

REQUEST NO. 8:

Admit that Defendant Kent Allyn

executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and
as a partner in J & D Properties.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 4 above.

REQUEST NO. 9:

Admit that Defendant John B. Swank

executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and
as a partner in J & D Properties.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 5 above.

REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent
Allyn executed Exhibit "C" to the Complaint on or about October
31, 1985.

-4ANSWERs

Admit to the execution of the Assignment, a

copy of which is attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint with
Civil No. C86-6726.
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit

that

Defendant

Richard

John

Allyn executed Exhibit "C" to the Complaint on or about October
31, 1985.
ANSWER:

Deny.

This document was signed by Douglas

Kent Allyn for Allyn & Company.
REQUEST NO. 12:
1985

Defendants

Douglas

Admit that on or about October 31,
Kent

Allyn

and

Richard

John

Allyn,

Sr.f were partners in Allyn and Company, a California partnership.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST

NO.

13:

Admit

executed Exhibit C to the Complaint

that

Douglas

Kent

Allyn

in behalf of himself and

Richard John Allyn, Sr., as partners in Allyn and Company, a
California partnership.
ANSWER:
behalf

of

Admit

that Douglas Kent Allyn executed in

the partnership.

There was no intent to sign on

behalf of Richard John Allyn, Sr. personally.
REQUEST NO. 14:

Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent

Allyn executed Exhibit "D" to the Complaint on or about January
15, 1986.
ANSWER:

Admit to execution of Renewal Agreement as

of the date set forth thereon, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit D. to the Complaint with Civil Mo. C86-6726.

-5REQUEST NO. 15:

Admit that Defendant Jonh B. Swank

executed Exhibit "D" to the Complaint on or about January 15,
1986.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 2 above.

REQUEST NO. 16:

Admit that Defendant Douglas Kenc

Allyn executed Exhibit M E" to the Complaint on or about November
5, 1985.
ANSWER:

Deny.

The copy appears to have Swank's

REQUEST NO. 17:

Admit that Defendant John B. Swank

signature.

executed Exhibit "E" to the Complaint on or about November 5,
1985.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 2 above.

REQUEST NO. 18:

Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent

Allyn failed to make payments on Exhibit "E" to the Complaint,
resulting in foreclosure proceedings by Commerce Finacial.
ANSWER:

Deny as to Doug Kent Allyn who was not

obligated under Exhibit E.
REQUEST NO. 19:

Admit that on July 15, 1986, Plain-

tiff purchased an assignment of Commerce Financial's interest
in the real property described in Exhibit "F" to the Complaint,
ANSWER:
therefore deny.

Defendants have no way of knowing this and
Plaintiff should have this information.

REQUEST NO. 20:
Allyn

executed

Exhibit

November 6, 1985.

Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent

"F"

to

the Complaint

on or about

-6ANSWER:

Deny,

This appears to bear Swank's signa-

ture.
REQUEST NO. 21:

Admit that Defendant John B. Swank

executed Exhibit "F" to the Complaint on or about November 6,
1985.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 2 above*

REQUEST NO. 22:

Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent

Allyn failed to make payments according to the requirements of
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint.
ANSWER:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 23:

Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent

Allyn failed to make payments according to the requirements of
Exhibit "E" to the Complaint.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 18 above.

DATED this

„-V;- day of June, 1988.

Atxorn^Y for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF HAND"DELIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Response to Requests for
Admissions were h«u*4-*4a4rivered on the . * . " day of June, 1988,
to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN A. ANDERSON

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6726
Honorable John A. Rokich

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

John A. Anderson, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah, over the age

of 18, and otherwise competent to make this affidavit.

Except

those matters stated on information and belief, which I believe

to be true, the matters set forth below are based on my
personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and
would competently testify thereto.
2.

I am a shareholder in the law firm of Van Cott,

Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott") in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar and

I am qualified to practice before all courts of the State of
Utah.
3.

Van Cott has been retained by Grant Thornton, the

court appointed receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial
Corporation dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division
("Interlake") to prosecute the present action.

I am the

attorney now primarily responsible for the prosecution of said
action.

In such capacity, I am familiar with the costs which

have been advanced and the attorneys' fees charged and to be
charged in collecting the amounts due under the subject
Promissory Notes and in foreclosing the subject Trust Deeds by
Van Cott.
4.

The plaintiff's request for attorneys* fees is

predicated on the specific provisions of the Promissory Note
dated October 31, 1985 and the accompanying Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents of eve : date, both of which provide for the
payment of all costs, a reasonable attorneys' fee and expenses
incurred by Interlake Thrift upon default.
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This request is

also based on the Promissory Note dated November 5, 1985 by and
between John Swank and Commerce Financial, as well as the
accompanying Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents of even
date, both of which provide for the payment of all costs and
expenses incurred in the collection of the Note, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of any judicial action
brought as a result of a default therein.

The Commerce

Financial Note and Trust Deed were assigned to plaintiff, as a
result of which plaintiff is entitled to recover all attorneys'
fees and costs expended both by Commerce Financial and
Interlake as a result of the maker's default thereunder.
5.

The attorneys' fees which plaintiff has incurred

for services through November 1, 1989 in collecting the amounts
due under the subject Promissory Notes and foreclosing the
subject Trust Deeds is $5,948.75, based on 61.50 hours of work
by the following attorneys:
Patricia Olsen
Patricia Olsen
Thomas T. Billings
Thomas T. Billings
Marilyn M. Henriksen
John A. Anderson

9.00
7.00
1.25
1.50
7.50
15.25

hours
hours
hours
hours
hours
hours

at $80.00 per hour
at $85.00 per hour
at $130.00 per hour
at $140.00 per hour
at $95.00 per hour
at $95.00 per hour

John A. Anderson

20.00 hours

at $105.00 per hour

These hourly rates are below the normal hourly rate charged by
attorneys at Van Cott and are reasonable fees for comparable
legal services.
6.

These services represent time spent in

investigation of facts, legal research, drafting of the
-3-

Complaint, discovery matters, preparation of the motion for
summary judgment and related pleadings, interoffice
conferences, conferences with Grant Thornton and its
representatives, preparation of correspondence and telephone
conferences with plaintiff, third parties and opposing counsel,
and protection of the Trust Deed Property.
7.

Assuming that no services are required beyond

final preparation of the motion for summary judgment after
November 1, 1989, responding to defendants' opposition to said
motion, if any, appearing and arguing the motion, preparing the
appropriate order and documents relating to the sale of
collateral and attending the sheriff's sale, the additional
attorneys' fees to be charged to plaintiff will be
approximately $2,000.00.
8.

All of said services rendered or to be rendered by

Van Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary
in the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise germane to this
action.
DATED this fc^L^day of November, V989.

-<•-

S T A T E OF U T A H

)

C O U N T Y OF S A L T L A K E

)

ss .

The

foregoing

instrument was acknowledged

this in-iVx d a y of N o v e m b e r ,

before me

1 9 8 9 , by J o h n A . A n d e r s o n .

C±~tResiding at: ftU-U-LM , 1/Jjt>\

"ifOfARYY PUBLIC

^~~

My Commission Expires

m-v

.^s&
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of John A. Anderson to be

fe/,day of f J ^ ^ M ^

mailed, postage prepaid, this
1989, to the following:

John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 9

7007A
110389
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRIS DAVIS

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6726
Honorable John A. Rokich

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Chris Davis, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, over the age of 18, and otherwise competent to make this
affidavit.

Except those matters stated on information and

belief, which I believe to be true, the matters set forth below

are based on my personal knowledge, and if called as a witness,
I could and would competently testify thereto.
2.

I was employed by Interlake Thrift as the Office

Manager of the Mortgage Division from approximately January,
1983 to June, 1985.

In that capacity, I familiarized myself

with the business records of Interlake Thrift, including the
records maintained by Interlake Thrift in the regular and
ordinary course of its business relating to loan transactions
such as those at issue in the present lawsuit.
3.

On July 1, 1987, Grant Thornton was appointed as

the receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial Corporation,
dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division.
4.

I have been employed as Operations Manager of

Interlake Thrift from August, 1987 to the present.

In that

capacity, I have access to and am familiar with the business
records of Interlake Thrift which it has maintained in the
regular and ordinary course of its business to reflect loan
transactions such as those at issue in the present lawsuit.

My

job responsibilities include, among other things, supervision
and collection of Interlake Thrift's delinquent loan accounts.
Interlake Thrift Loan
5.

I have reviewed and am personally familiar with

Interlake Thrift's documents concerning Loan No. L200179, which
relates to that certain Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985
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in the principal amount of Two Hundred Two Thousand Four
Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($202,450.00) payable to USA
Financial Mortgage Corp. dba Interlake Thrift, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit
M

A.,f

The records of Interlake Thrift reflect that this loan

amount was disbursed to or the benefit of the makers, Douglas
Allyn and John Swank, on or about October 31, 1985.
6.

I have also reviewed and am personally familiar

with that certain Deed of Trust dated October 31, 1985 by and
between J & D Properties, Inc., Douglas Allyn and John Swank.
This Deed of Trust encumbers certain real property situated at
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah at
approximately 315 East 300 South as more particularly described
therein.
7.

I have also reviewed and am personally familiar

with that certain Assignment dated October 31, 1985 in behalf
of Allyn and Company, a California general partnership,
assigning to USA Financial Corporation, all of Allyn and
Company's right, title and interest in and to PRB, Ltd., a
California limited partnership.

A true and correct copy of

this Assignment is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "C.M
8.

Defendants John Swank and Douglas Allyn have

failed to make payments according to the requirements of the
Promissory Note (Exhibit "A") and are default thereunder.
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This

default first occurred on April 30, 1986 when, pursuant to the
Renewal Agreement (Exhibit

M

D M ) , said defendants failed to make

the required payment of principal and accrued interest.
9.

As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due and

owing under the Promissory Note was $371,871.30, which includes
the principal balance of $251,349.69 and accrued interest of
$120,521.67.
10.

The principal balance due includes the original

loan amount and costs together with accrued interest from the
date of the Promissory Note to and including December 31,
1987.

Thereafter, Interlake Thrift1s records were computerized

and a separate interest balance was calculated with respect to
said Note.

The separate accrued interest figure reflects

interest which has accrued since January 1, 1988 at the rate of
18% per annum, the penalty rate set forth in the Promissory
Note.

The per diem charge on this Promissory Note is $123.96.
Commerce Financial Loan
11.

I have reviewed and am personally familiar with

Interlake Thrift's records concerning that certain loan
transaction by and between Commerce Financial and John Swank
that is also the subject of this lawsuit.

On or about November

5, 1985, defendant John Swank executed a second Promissory Note
in the principal amount of Four Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand
Four Hundred Nineteen and 64/100 Dollars ($455,419.64) payable
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to Commerce Financial.

A true and correct copy of this second

Promissory Note is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "E."
12.

As security for the second Promissory Note, Swank

executed a Deed of Trust dated November 5, 1985, encumbering
the same real property as was encumbered as security for
Interlake Thrift's Loan No. L200179.

A true and correct copy

of this second Trust Deed is attached to the Complaint as
Exhibit "F."
13.

Commerce Financial later declared this second

Promissory Note to be in default and initiated foreclosure of
the subject Trust Deed Property.

As a result, on or about July

15, 1986, Interlake paid $513,033.78 to purchase an assignment
of Commerce Financial's interest in and to the above-described
second Promissory Note and Deed of Trust.

A true and correct

copy of this Assignment is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit
"G."
14.

On July 15, 1986, Interlake Thrift began to carry

this Commerce Financial loan in the principal amount of
$513,033.78 on its records.
15.

Swank has failed to make payments according to

the requirements of the second Promissory Note (Exhibit

M

EM)

and is in default thereunder.
16.

As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due on

the second Promissory Note was $843,535.10, which includes the
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principal balance of $536,421.74 and accrued interest of
$307,113.36.
17.

The principal amount due includes the amount

transferred to Interlake Thrift
accrued interest

as of July 15, 1986 with

through December 31, 1987.

Interlake Thrift's records were computerized

Thereafter,
and a separate

interest balance was calculated with respect to said Note.
separate accrued interest
accrued since January

The

figure reflects interest which has

1, 1988 at the penalty rate of 18%

specified in the Promissory Note.

The per diem charge on this

loan is $264.54.
18.

Interlake retained the law firm of Van Cott,

Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
present action.

( M Van Cott") to prosecute the

The services rendered or to be rendered by Van

Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary

in

the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise related to this
action.
DATED this J

i-SI-

day of November,

Cnris Davis
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1989.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me
this / ---^ day of November.,^ 1989, by Chris Davis

-£XCtt>

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at: MUA
My Commission Expires:
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c^...

_ .

-X./U.. & C

:

«.

(,/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of Chris Davis to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this \ ^ \

day of November, 1989, to

the following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, Calirfo^nia 92020

fcihflfc
7004A
102589
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN B. ANDERSON
)

VS.

)
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT
)
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
)
a California Partnership;
)
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a California
)
Partnership,
)
Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C86-6724

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. C86-6725

)

JOHN B. SWANK an individual, )
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a Partnership; all
)
dba Parkway Village, a Joint )
Venture,
)
Defendants.

)

EXHIBIT B

-2STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE )
Affiant, John B. Anderson, being first duly sworn
upon his oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

That he is a citizen of the United State o c

America and a resident of the State of Utah over the age of 21
years,
2.

That he is an attorney at law licensed to prac-

tice in the State of Utah.
3.

That on' or about June 22, 19PQ, the undersiqned

filed a Notice of Withdrawal in connection with his representation

of Defendants, Douglas

Kent

Allyn

and Pichard

John

Allyn, Sr., in the above-entitled matter.
4.
standing

with

That such withdrawal
said

Defendants, that

is based uoon an underthe undersigned

should

represent them any further in the above-entitled matter.
5.

That on or about November 13, 1989, the under-

signed received a telephone request from Douglas Allyn, one of
the above named Defendants who resides in El Caion, California,
that the undersigned again undertake representation of said
Defendants in connection with the above-entitled matter based
upon certain Motions that had been filed against Defendants in
this action.
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That said Defendants subseauently mailed a coov

of various documents

to the undersigned

pertaining

to said

Motions and the undersigned has consented to further represent
said Defendants in the above-entitled matter*
7.

In connection

therewith, the undersigned

has

filed with the Court; concurrent herewith, an Entry of Appearance on behalf of said Defendants.
8.
and belief

That the undersigned understands on information
from discussing

the matter with said

Defendants

that the Defendants do not understand the significance of said
Motions on the Defendants in the event said Defendants did not
file a response thereto and accordingly, would suffer irreperable harm in the event they are not represented in the present
proceeding.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAIETH NOT this / ^ W ? a y of November,
1989.

Jojfn^urxon Anderson

/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN «r~£efore me this / ^ ^ d a v of
November, 1989.

-4CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit on this ^/fl^'dav of November,
1989, postage prepaid to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLFY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, P.O.
Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah

84145.
/!
!*

I:
1

^ N
.

\

uJi . ^ , ^ / C Jo-trkteru

JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #00 92
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT
)
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
)
a California Partnership;
)
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a California
)
Partnership,
)

EX PARTE MOTION

vs.

Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JOHN B. SWANK an individual, )
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a Partnership; all
)
dba Parkway Village, a Joint )
Venture,
)
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-6724

Civil No. C86-6725

-2The Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John
Allynf Sr., by and through their leqal counsel, John Burton
Anderson, respectfully

represent to and moves the Court as

follows:
1.

The entry of appearance of John Burton Anderson

as legal counsel for said Defendants is filed with the Court
concurrent with this Motion.
2.

Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter has filed

its "Motions for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment" in the
above-entitled matter, which Motions are presently before the
Court.
3.
Plaintiff,
counsel

That at

said

the time of

Defendants

were

filinq

not

said Motions bv

represented

in this matter, notwithstanding

by

leaal

that they had pre-

viously been served with "Notice to Appoint Counsel or Appear
in Person".
4.

That said Defendants are residents of the State

of California and are not acquainted

with the laws of the

State of Utah nor do they understand the siqnificance of the
failure

to appoint

legal

counsel or appear

in person with

respect to matters involved in the above-entitled action; that
such failure to appoint counsel or appear in person is due to
understandable neglect on the part of said Defendants and that
had said Defendants understood the significance of such neglect
or failure to appoint or appear they would have responded in a
timely manner.

-35.
Summary

That by reason of the filing of such Motions for

Judgment

and

Default

Judgment

by

Plaintiffs, said

Defendants would suffer irreparable harm due to such understandable neglect.
ACCORDINGLY, SAID DEFENDANTS HEREBY MOVE THE COURT1
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an
order as follows:
1.

That consideration

of Plaintiff's

Motion for

Summary Judgment and Default Judgment and any decision thereon
by

the above-entitled

Court

be

continued

for a period

of

thirty (30) days from the date of such Order.
2.

That John B. Anderson as counsel for said Defen-

dants be permitted to file appropriate resoonses on behalr of
said

Defendants

under

the Rule

4-501

of the Utah Code of

Judicial Administration.
This Motion is based upon the matter set forth above
and upon the Affidavit of John B. Anderson as legal counsel
for said Defendants which Affidavit is attached hereto.
DATED t h i s / ^ ^ i a y of November, 19R9.

-4CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Ex Parte Motion on this /Jj

day of

November, 1989, postage prepaid to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT,
BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600,
P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah

8414S.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

REQUEST FOR RULING
AND OBJECTION TO EX PARTE
MOTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership: DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6724
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK an individual,
DOUGLAS KENT.ALLYN. and
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR.,
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a
Partnership; all dba Parkway
Village, a Joint Venture,

Civil No. C86-6725
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

EXHIBIT C

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division (MInterlakeM) hereby moves pursuant
to Rule 4-501(8) for an order granting its motions for summary
judgment and default judgment in the above-captioned matter.
Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and default judgment
were served on defendant John B. Swank at his last known
address in Pasa Robles, California by mail on November 6,
1989.

These pleadings were returned to Van Cott, Bagley,

Cornwall & McCarthy on or about November 12, 1989 by the United
States Post Office with a notification that Mr. Swank no longer
resides at his last known address and has left no'forwarding
address.

Swank, however, is already in default and service of

these pleadings is unnecessary for plaintiff to obtain a
default judgment against him.
(1989),

Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a)(2)

Accordingly, plaintiff hereby requests that a default

judgment be entered against Swank in accordance with the prayer
for relief set forth in plaintiff's complaint and in its motion
for entry of default judgment.
Likewise, the motion for summary judgment was served
on defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn on
November 6, 1989.

The Allyns have not filed counteraffidavits

or a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment against them.

Instead, on November 20, 1989, an

appearance was entered by John Burton Anderson as counsel for
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said defendants, and an ex parte motion was filed requesting
that the Allyns be given additional time in which to respond to
the motions for summary judgment.
Interlake Thrift objects to Mr. Anderson's appearance
as counsel and, further, objects to the ex parte motion to
extend the time within which said defendants may respond to the
motion for summary judgment.

On or about June 22, 1989, Mr.

Anderson filed his Notice of Withdrawal in connection with his
representation of the Allyns.

Immediately thereafter, on June

29, 1989, plaintiff filed and served on the Allyns a notice to
appear in person or to appoint counsel.

The Allyns did nothing

in response to this Notice until such time as they were served
with the present motions, when they allegedly contacted their
former counsel, John Burton Anderson, for the purpose of again
retaining his services despite his earlier withdrawal.
Mr. Anderson has filed an ex parte motion in behalf
of the Allyns stating, among other things, that said defendants
are understandably ignorant of and neglectful of Utah's laws
regarding appointment of counsel.

This motion should be

stricken as it is not supported by any competent affidavits
from the Allyns themselves but only by unverified allegations
from Mr. Anderson.

Further, the notice sent to the Allyns, a

copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," clearly and
unequivocally states that the Allyns are to appear in person or
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to appoint counsel in order to defend the present lawsuit.
Having failed to make any effort to do so, the Allyns waited
until after this motion was filed before taking any action in
that regard.
The present motion is a further effort by the Allyns
to unnecessarily delay the entry of a judgment against them on
the subject promissory notes and trust deeds.

The Allyns did

not cooperate with their counsel at the time he did represent
them and continually delayed in filing answers to discovery
requests.

In fact, the Allyns* discovery responses which ar

attached as an exhibit to the present motion were the result of
plaintiff's counsel's threats to move to compel adequate
responses to those discovery requests.
Defendants have not asserted any meritorious defense
to plaintiff's claims.

Defendants admit execution and default

under the subject promissory notes and trust deeds, but
apparently deny personal liability for any deficiency resulting
from the sale of the trust deed property.

This defense has

never been substantiated with any evidence from defendants
relieving them from any personal liability under the promissory
notes in the event the trust deed property did not satisfy the
default in their obligations thereunder.

None of the

transaction documents evidencing the subject loans release
defendants of such liability and this defense, as is true of
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the present motion, is interposed solely for the purpose of
delay and is not well founded in law or fact.
Accordingly, the Allynsf ex parte motion should be
denied and an order should enter granting plaintiff*s motion
for summary judgment pursuant to which plaintiff's counsel will
prepare an
in appropriate judgment.

DATED this ^ > d a y of

/[Jd^J^J^

%

1989

VAN COTT, BAGLByy/CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Request for Ruling and Objection to
Ex Parte Motion to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
of

NiwJ^OS

, 1989, to the following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
John Burton Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & DUNN
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn^
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 9

7099A
113089
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day

JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 34121
Telephone: (301) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
vs.
)
)
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT
)
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
)
a California Partnership;
)
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a California
)
Partnership,
)
Defendants.
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT 0*
DOUGLAS KENT ALL^N
Civil No. C36-S724

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. CS6-6725

)

JOHN B. SWANK an individual, )
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a Partnership; all
)
dba Parkway Village, a Joint )
Venture,
)
Defendants.

)

EXHIBIT D

-2STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
)ss.
COUNTY
)
The Affiant, Kent Allyn, beiru? first duly sworn uoon
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That he is competent to testify as a witness and

personally knows the facts stated herein are true.
2.

That in connection with the loan transactions

between Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., dba
Allyn and Company and USA Financial Corporation dba Tnterlake
Thrift, pertaining to certain property known as "The Parkwav
Village" which was a part thereof, the following is true to
the best of Affiant's understanding and knowledge:
a.
The Parkway Village property was purchased
from one of Interlake Thrift's customers who had
completed approximately 50% of the proiect while
being funded 100% of a construction loan of
Interlake Thrift pertaining thereto.
b.
Originally the purchase was to be in the
name of a corporation of the Defendants or in
the alternative in the name of John Swank, one
of the above Defendant's herein. Although Swank
was the main strength to the transaction, Jefc
Perkins, an officer of Interlake Thrift, indicated that Interlake Thri ft could not have the
transaction in Swank's nar\e because the total
amount would exceed Interlake1s legal limit.
c.
After conversations with Perkins and as a
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins
assured Affiant and others that there would be
no personal liability toward them as part of the
transaction and the parties then consented to
signing for part of the loan.

-3d. That Perkins represented that if the oroiect
did not go forward, Interlace Thrift would look
only to the property and not to the Defendant's
individually for satisfaction.
Accordingly,
Affiant and Richari John Allyn signed the loan
documents on that basis.
e. John Swank did not sign on behalf of Allyn
and Company, Affiant or Richard John Allyn.
f. In addition to representations of no personal
liability in connection with said loans, Affiant
and Richard John Allyn relied upon said Perkins
representations as to the value and feasibility
to this project and that Interlake Thrift would
subsequently subordinate its interest in the
project.
g. All monies advanced by Interlake Thrift were
used in either this project or a second proiect
associated with this project.
h.
Neither Affiant nor Richard John Allyn
received any funds from Interlake Thrift as part
of said loan transaction.
3.

That the above information has been recited an^

given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories" dated July ?2, I9«a
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a copy of which
was delivered to Plaintiff.
4. .That the purpose o r tnis Affidavit is to demonstrate the existance of questions of fact with respect to the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dlaintiff in this matter.
DATED this j ^

day of "ec^mber, 19R9.

/

Dou^lvs ?ent

^JS(U.
Allvn

i v - ^ . " ^ r , ^ , ,"•

SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this
/ v ^ d a y of December, 1989,
/

/

/V

/

My Commission Expires:

•

-

-

/ /
V

/

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OP MAILIWG
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Douglas Kent Allvn on this
l^j

day of December, 1989, postage preoaid

to 7ohn A.

Anderson, VAN COTT, 8AGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 50 South
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah

&HASYl4ff*{<4y£l

84145.
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (301) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTYf STATE OP UTAF
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT
)
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, a )
California Partnership;
)
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD)
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND)
COMPANY, a California
)
Partnership,
)

MEMORANDUM I N OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

Defendants.

Civil No. 036-6^26

)

The Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard Jo'^n
Allyn, Sr., pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah ^ules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 4.501 of the Rules oc Judicial Administration
hereby

submit

their

responsive

Memorandum

to

Plaintiff1 .i

Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as set forth in Plaintiff*
"Memorandum

of Points and Authorities

in Supoort of Plain-

tiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment" are
essentially correct except
that

the Defendants

for the statements to the effect

were acting

either

personally or as a

-11INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

Do you contend that there was

a failure of consideration from the Plaintiff to Defendants in
the subject transaction?

If so, state the following:

(a)

All facts on which you base this conten-

(b)

All persons with knowledge of any facts

tion;

that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary
of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2{a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO, 15: Do you contend that Defendants
have a right of offset against Plaintiff which

is at least

equal to the amount prayer for by Plaintiff in Complaint?

If

so, state the following:
(a)
tion, including

but

All facts on which you base this contennot

limited

*-c the specific amount of

Defendants' alleged offset and tho manner in which you calculated said amount;
(b)

All persons with Knowledge of any facts

that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary
of each such person's knowledge;

:

mi

-12(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2ia) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

Do you contend that to grant

relief requested by the Plaintiff in the Complaint would result
in unjust enrichment at the expense of the Defendants?

If so,

state the following:
(a)

All facts on which you base this conten-

(b)

All persons with knowledge of any facts

tion;

that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary
of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss, reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph i;c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 17:
made
them?

Do you contend that Plaintiff

fraudulent misrepresentations
If so, state the following:

to Defendants or any of

-13-

(a)
tion

including

All facts on which you base this conten-

specifically

each alleged

misrepresentat ionf.

the date thereof, the person(s) who communicated

each such

misrepresentation as well as each person to whom it was communicated, and the method of communication;
(b)

All persons with knowledge of any facts

that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary
of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss, reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 18:

Do you contend that Plaintiff

failed to disclose material facts to Defendants, or any of
them, which

it had a duty

to disclose?

If so, state the

following:
(a)

All facts on which you base this conten-

tion, including all facts on which you base a claim that
Plaintiff owed a duty to disclose material facts to Defendants
and all such omitted facts;
(b)

All persons with knowledge of any facts

that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary
of each such person*s knowledge; and

-14(c)

All documents that discuss, reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph 1(b) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

Do you contend that Plaintiff

is estopped from asserting and/or recovering pursuant to any
of claims set forth in Complaint?

If so, state the following:

(a)

All facts which you base this contention;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of any facts

that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary
of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss, reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO* 20:

Identify each person who you

expect to or may call as a witness at trial, and for each such
person state the following:
(a) The subject matter about which the witness
is expected to testify; and

-15(b) The substance of the facts and opinions to
which the witness is expected to testify, including the source
of the witness' knowledge concerning such facts and/or opinions,
ANSWER:
lated.

A list of witnesses has not yet been formu-

However, it is anticipated

that such a list would

include those named in paragraph K b ) above.

If witnesses are

to come from outside this list or the parties, the answer will
be supplemented with the name of the anticipated witness.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

Identify each person who you

expect to or may call as an expert witness at trial.

For each

such expert state the following:
(a)

The subject matter about which the expert

is expected to testify; and
(b)

The substance of the facts and opinions

to which the expert is expected to testify.
(c)

A summary of the grounds for each such

opinion; and
(d) The fee and/or expenses to be paid to each
such expert.
ANSWER:

See paragraph 20 ioove.

INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Identify each document that

you intend to or may introduce for *ny purpose at trial.

For

each such document, identify the witness whom you expect will
lay the foundation for its admission.

-16AHSWER:

A list of documents has not yet been formu-

lated.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

State all known addresses and

telephone numbers, both current and past, of Defendant John B.
Swank.
ANSWER:
INTERROGATORY NO. 24:
fornia partnership?

Is J & D Properties a Cali-

If so, state the nature of the partnership

(i.e., general of limited), the identities of each partner,
including their respective share of ownership and whether the
partner

is a general or

limited

partner, and the business

address of the partnership.
ANSWER:

No

INTERROGATORY NO. 25: If your answer to the preceding
interrogatory

is no, identify the precise nature of J & D

Properties (i.e., corporation or other form of business entity),
its state of

incorporation

(if relevant) and

its principal

place of business.
ANSWER:

J i D Properties, Inc.

was supposed to be a

corporation, which status as a Utah corporation was to have
been set up and verified by Jeff Perkins.
INTERROGATORY NO. 26:
fornia partnership?

Is Allyn and Company a Cali-

If so, state the nature of the partnership

(i.e., general or limited), the identites of each partner,
including their respective share of ownership and whether the

-17partner

is a general

or

limited

partner, and the business

address of the partnership.
ANSWER:

Yes, a general partnership who^e address is

GENERAL PARTNERS

SHARE OF OWNERSHIP

Douglas Kent Allyn
Richard J. Allyn
INTERROGATORY NO. 27:
ceding

interrogatory

If your answer, to the pre-

is no, identify

the precise nature of

Allyn and Company (i.e., corporation or other form of business
entity),

its state

of

incorporation

(if

relevant) and

its

principal place of business.
ANSWER:

Not applicable

Dated this a^a?

day of £**%,

1988.

Douglas Kent Allyn

'~fu

w
STATE OF tJTftH / .
)ss,
County of .Salfc Loflto
SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^J J) day of

My Commission Expires:

Notary
tary Public
Pufilic
Residing at: ^

ft

a

1988.

V

'

MARY ANN KLUG

<40rAPYPu8w.C

CA*..fO*NiA

SAA OiEOOCCtHTr

-18CERTIPICATB OF MAILI8G
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Response to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories on this
prepaid

day of June, 1988, postage

to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, 3AGLEY, CORNWALL &

MCCARTHY at 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84145.

JOHN BURTON ANDERSON *0 092
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 20Q
Salt Lake C.ityf Utah 84121
Telephone: (301) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT QV
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN

vs.
Civil Mo. C86-6726
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
a California Partnership;
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,
Defendants.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF

)
)ss.
)

The Affiant, Kent Allyn, being first duly sworn >ioon
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That he is competent to testify as a witness and

personally knows the facts stated herein are true.
2.

That

in connection with

the loan

transaction

between Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allvn, 3r., dba
Allyn and Company and Interlake Thrift and is the subiect oc
the above-entitled

litigation, the following is true to the

best of Affiant's understanding an.l knowledge:

-2a. The project vhich is the subiect o* the loan
made by Interlake Thrift to Affiant and to the
other parties involved in this
transaction was
presented tc these parties by Jeff Perkins who
at the time was an officer of Plaintiff.
b.
Said Jeff Perkins oarticioated in putting
the purchase of the property bv these parties
together and upon information and belief, he,
together with his employer, Tnterlake Thrift,
received a commission from the seller of the
property involved in the transaction.
c.
The initial money for the down payment in
this transaction came from the loan amount made
by Interlake Thrift to Mr. John Swank for the
purchase of a separate project known as Parkway
Village.
d«
Because efforts at getting a construction
loan had failed, Plaintiff had agreed to advance
funds in the amount of $200,000.00 to J & D
Properties, Inc., which said Perkins had reoresented to be a valid corporation under the laws
of the State of <Jtah in order to close the
purchase of the land as part of the project.
e.
All signings by those Defendants were as
corporate officers and not as individuals based
on representations made by Perkins.
f.
After conversations with Perkins and as a
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins
assured Affiant and others that there would be
no personal liability tow^M then as oart of the
transaction and the parties then consented to
signing for part of the Loan.
g. That Perkins represented that if the proiect
did not go forward, Tnterlake Thrift woul1 look
only to the property vvl net to the Defendant's
individually for c a' i ^ra :t ion.
According!'/,
Affiant and Richard '•;,-*. ? Allyn siqned the loan
documents on that basi-:.

-33,

That the above information has been recited ani

given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories" dated Julv 22, 19R8
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a cooy o* which
v/as delivered to Plaintiff.
4.

That the purpose of this Affidavit is to demon-

strate the existance of questions of fact with respect to the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintifc in this matter.
/±

DATED this

day of December, 1989.

-. :LAL

I^\

JANE A. GUTHRIE
PP1N« F^LCr^-'-C 'N
,...... - : — IN'Y
., i <c M I V )i

}
:?n

J

Douglas'Hent Allyn

T

SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me t M *
/ •<;'-** day of December, 1989.

My Commission Expires:
T

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

±
CERTIFICATE

OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Doualas Kent Allyn on t M s
IY

day of December, 1989, oostaqe

oreoaid

to John A.

Anderson, VAN COTT, 3AGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY ac SO South
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah

./:>. :ifU"-K/l

R4145,
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Thomas T. Billings, Bar No. 0331
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6726
Honorable John A. Rokich

Defendants.

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division (Interlake") submits the following
reply points and authorities in support of its motions for
summary judgment and default judgment and in response to the
opposition memorandum filed ry : — " - • • ! -a :i t s Douglas Kent Ailyn,
Richard John Allyn, and Allyn ±:\.i Jimpany (collectively the
"Allyn Defendants').

1G: WPL 159 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 . W 5 0

EXHIBIT F

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed this action to collect two promissory
notes and foreclose two deeds of trust encumbering the same real
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the
"Property").

The two promissory notes and deeds of trust (trust

deeds") are separately identified in plaintiff's memorandum of
points and authorities as the "Interlake Thrift Loan" and the
"Commerce Financial Loan."

The Interlake Thrift Loan was made

m

October, 1985, and the trust deed was recorded in March, 1986.
The Commerce Financial Loan was made in November, 1985, and the
trust deed securing that loan was recorded the following day, on
November 6, 19 85.
Commerce Financial Loan
Defendant John Swank, who executed the Commerce
Financial Note and trust deed is in default and has not responded
to the present motion for default judgment.

The facts concerning

the Commerce Financial Loan are not in dispute and have not been
contested by the Allyn Defendants.

Accordingly, this Court

should order the sale of the subject property in satisfaction o:
said default, with a deficiency judgment to be entered against
Swank. This Court should also declare that the Commerce Financial
trust deed is senior to and takes priority over the trust deed
securing the Interlake Thrift L:a:i since it was recorded prior in
time. Plaintiff anticipates that the sale proceeds of the subject

-2G:\WPL 159 00000101.W50

property will not exceed the amount presently due and owing on
the Commerce Financial Loan.
Interlake Thrift Loan
With respect to the Interlake Thrift Loan, plaintiff
alleges that both Douglas Kent Allyn and John B. Swank are
jointly and severally liable for payment of the promissory note.
Additionally, there is no dispute that Douglas Allyn executed an
assignment in behalf of Allyn and Company of its interest in a
California limited partnership known as PRB, Ltd.

Finally, the

Allyn Defendants have not disputed the facts set forth in
plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities to the effect
that the promissory note and trust deed were executed by Douglas
Allyn and John Swank and that the parties are in default
thereunder.
Douglas Allyn's defense alleges (1) that his execution
of the Interlake Thrift Loan documents was in behalf of J & D
Properties, Inc., a corporation to which the funds were to have
been disbursed and which was to have been incorporated under the
laws of the State of Utah, and (2) prior to executing the subject:
loan documents, Allyn was assured by Jeff Perkins, an officer of
Interlake Thrift, that he would have no personal liability in the
event of a default.
Interlake Thrift contends, however, that Douglas
Allyn's unsubstantiated and self-serving allegations regarding

-3G:\WPL\i59\00000i01.w50

both his capacity in executing the loan documents and his
personal liability are inadmissible under the parol evidence
rule.

Further, even assuming that Douglas Allyn executed the

loan documents in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc., there is no
reference to that fact on the Promissory Note.

Under Utah law,

unless the instrument clearly indicates that the signature is
made in some other capacity, it is a personal indorsement of the
signator.

Moreover, the signature of an authorized

representative who signs his own name to an instrument personally
obligates the representative on the instrument if the instrument
neither names the person represented nor shows that the
representative signed in a representative capacity.

Since the

subject promissory note indicates absolutely no representative
capacity and makes no reference whatsoever to J & D Properties,
Inc,

then even if J & D Properties had been validly incorporated,

Douglas Allyn would be personally liable on the subject
promissory note.

Likewise, the trust deed clearly indicates that

it is being executed by Douglas Allyn in its individual capacity.
Finally, Allyn has not alleged and there is no evidence
that J & D Properties, Inc. was ever incorporated in the State of
Utah or elsewhere.

It is well established that where there has

been a defective incorporation, the incorporators are personally
liable for the contracts of the putative corporation.

Thus, to

the extent Allyn claims to have executed the loan documents in

-4G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50

behalf of a corporation of which he apparently was to have been
an officer, but which was never validly incorporated, he is
personally liable on those loan documents.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT ALLYN'S AFFIDAVIT
Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn has filed an affidavit in
support of his opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment.

This affidavit alleges in Subparagraphs (a) through

(g) of Paragraph 2 certain "facts" to which Interlake Thrift
hereby responds in order to demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact that may properly be admitted into
evidence.
1.

With respect to Subparagraph 2(a), Interlake

Thrift will admit that allegation solely for the purpose of this
motion and for no other purpose.

However, this allegation is

completely irrelevant to the disposition of this motion.
2.

With respect to Subparagraph 2(b), Interlake

Thrift moves to strike this paragraph on the basis it is
irrelevant and lacks foundation.

Interlake Thrift will admit for

purposes of this motion, however, that it did receive a customary
loan origination fee (rather than a commission) as a result of
this loan transaction.
3.

With respect to Subparagraph 2(c), Interlake

Thrift moves to strike this subparagraph on the grounds it lacks
foundation.

Again, however, this allegation is irrelevant.

-5G: WPL 159 0000010L.W50

4.

With respect to Subparagraph 2(d), Interlake

Thrift moves to strike these allegations on the grounds they are
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.

The subject loan

documents are not in dispute and clearly and unambiguously
provide for the individual liability of Swank and Allyn.
5.
2(g),

With respect to Subparagraphs 2(e), 2(f), and

Interlake Thrift objects to these allegations and moves to

strike them on the grounds they are inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule.
6.

With respect to Paragraph 3, Interlake Thrift

objects to incorporation of the Allyns* own responses to
interrogatories on the grounds such evidence is inadmissible in
response to a motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

SWANK IS IN DEFAULT UNDER THE COMMERCE FINANCIAL LOAN.
INTERLAKE THRIFT IS, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO AN ORDER
FORECLOSING THE trust deed SECURING THAT LOAN.
Swank is in default under the Commerce Financial Loan

which was assigned in July, 1986 to Interlake Thrift.

There is

no dispute regarding any facts relating to or concerning this
loan and, therefore, Interlake Thrift is clearly entitled to an
order selling the subject property in satisfaction of this loan.
Further, Interlake Thrift is entitled to an order establishing
the priority of the Commerce Fina:1. Lai trust deed based on the
fact it was recorded several tenths prior to the Interlake Thrift

-6G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50

trust deed.

The Allyns have not disputed plaintiff's entitlement

to this relief.
II.

DEFENDANTS DO NOT DISPUTE THAT THERE IS A DEFAULT IN
THE UNDERLYING INTERLAKE THRIFT LOAN TRANSACTION.
xMOREOVER, DEFENDANTS HAVE INTRODUCED NO COMPETENT OR
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY ARE NOT
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE DEFAULT IN SAID LOAN
TRANSACTION.
Swank is also in default with respect to the Interiake

Thrift loan transaction.

Plaintiff is entitled to an order

granting default judgment and selling the subject property, and
to entry of a deficiency judgment as a result of this default.
Further, the Allyns have not disputed the default in the
underlying obligation nor that there was a valid assignment of
Allyn & Company's partnership interest in PRB, Ltd. as security
for this indebtedness.

Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an

order selling the subject Property and Allyn and Company's
interest in PRB, Ltd. in satisfaction of this indebtedness.
The Allyns only defense is that they are not personally
liable for any deficiency because (1) they executed the Interiake
Thrift Loan documents in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc., which
they concede was never validly incorporated in Utah or any other
state, and (2) they were assured prior to executing these
documents that in the event of a default, the lender would look
only to the property and not to them personally for satisfaction
of the loan.

7G:\WPL\L59\00000101.W50

1.

The Parol Evidence Rule Bars Admission of Evident
Offered to Vary or Contradict the Terms of a
Written Instrument.

Utah follows the well established rule that parol
evidence may not be introduced to add to, vary or contradict the
terms of a written instrument.

In Younaren v. Lloyd Construction

Company, Inc. , 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court
definded the rule as follows:
When parties have negotiated on a subject and
have thereafter entered into a written
contract, it should be assumed that their
prior negotiations are fused into the
contract so that it represents their full
agreement with respect thereto; and that,
consequently, after its due execution,
extraneous evidence should ordinarily not be
permitted to add to, subtract from, vary, or
contradict it.
Id. at 987.

Accordingly, Douglas Allyn's unsubstantiated and

self serving allegation that he executed all loan documents in
behalf of J & D Properties, Inc. should not be admitted when it
is clear from the face of the promissory note that he is
individually liable and there is absolutely no reference therein
to J & D Properties, Inc.

Likewise, since the trust deed clearly

and unambiguously provides that he is executing it in his
individual capacity, parol evidence should not be introduced to
contradict that provision.
Similarly, Allyn's assertion that he was assured prior
to executing the loan documents that he would have no personal
liability in the event of default is inadmissible.
-8G:\WPl\159\00000101.W50

The

promissory note (Exhibit "A") states that the undersigned (Swank
and Allyn) jointly and severally promise to pay the principal
balance plus interest to Interlake Thrift.

Although the

promissory note later refers to the fact that it is secured by a
trust deed on real property, it makes absolutely no reference to
this trust deed as being Interlake Thrift's sole recourse in the
event of default.

Thus, Allyn's testimony is offered solely to

add to, vary and/or contradict the express terms of the
promissory note.1

It is this promissory note that defines

Douglas Allyn's rights and obligations in the event of default.
2.

Allyn's Signature on the Promissory Note Obligates
Him Personally for Payment of the Sums Due
Thereunder.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-402 provides that "Unless the
instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some
other capacity, it is an indorsement."

Since Allyn's signature

on the promissory note does not indicate that he is signing in
some other capacity, he is deemed to have indorsed the instrument
and is personally liable thereunder.
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403 provides that an
authorized representative who signs in his own name "is

The trust deed also indicates that Douglas
it in his individual capacity. Although there
J & D Properties, Inc. as well, both Allyn and
behalf of J & D Properties, Inc. and in
capacities. Consequently, there is no question
liable on the trust deed.

-9G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50

Allyn is executing
is a reference to
Swank executed in
their individual
that Allyn is also

-2California partnership.

At the time the documentation referred

to therein was executed by Defendants, Defendants were led to
believe that they were executing

the sane as 2 coroorati.cn

which

to the^ Vv

mistaken

belief

was given

m

occicer

cF

Plaintiff viz., Jeff Perkins.
All of such documentation used in the transaction was
prepared by Plaintiff and was based OP. misrepresentation anl
fraudulent statements made by said Jeff Perking an officer of
Plaintiff, as more particularly set forth in the Affidavit of
Douglas Kent Allyn, which is attached hereto.

The additional

facts as contained in said Affidavit are set forth as follows:
a.
The project which is the subiect of the loan
made by Tnterlake Thrift to Affiant and to the
other parties involved in this transaction was
presented to these parties by Jeff Perkins who
at the time was an officer of Plaintiff.
b.
Said Jeff Perkins participated in outtina
the purchase of the property bv these parties
together and upon information and belief, he,
together with
his employer, Tnterlake Thrift,
received a commission from the seller of t^e
property involved in the transaction.
c.
The initial money for the down payment in
this transaction came from the loan amount ma^^
by Interlake Thrift to Mr. John Swank for the
purchase of a separate project known as Parkwav
Village.
d.
Because efforts at getting a construction
loan had failed, Plaintiff nad aareed to advance
funds in the amount of $200,000.00 to J & n
Properties, Inc., which said Perkins had represented to be a valid corporation 'inder the laws
of the State of Utah in order to close the
purchase of the land as part of the oroiect.

-3e.
All signings by those Defendants were as
corporate officers and nor: as individuals based
on representations made by Perkins.
f.
After conversations v:ith Perkins and as a
means of accounting, Interlace Thrift and Perkins
assured Affiant and others that there would he
no personal liability toward them as oart o F the
transaction and the parties then consented to
signing for part of the loan.
g.
That Perkins represented that if the project
did not go forward, Interlake Thrift would look
only to the property and not to the Defendant's
individually
for
satisfaction.
Accordinalv,
Affiant and Richard John Allyn sianed the loan
documents on that basis.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In order for Plaintiff to prevail on its Motion for
Summary Judgment it must be shown that, based on the pleadings
and the affidavits of the parties, there is no issue as to anv
material fact and that the party is entitled to iudqment as a
matter of law.

Orwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d, 595 CJtah).

As to Points IT, III and IV, all of the saire are
based on facts propounded by Plaintiff but which are contested
by Defendant. Plaintiff merely recites those matters which ^re
shown on the face of the documentation which supoosedlv establishes the liability of the Defendants herein.
Other
lead

to

ignored

the
by

important

signing
Plaintiff,

of

c

actors

the

which

in

the

transaction whir*h

documentation
"actors,

when

are

completely

thorouahlv

and

-4accurately placed before a trier for adeauate consideration,
would show the transaction

to be not onlv invalid but e^en

fraudulent on the part of Plaintiff.

Xzxoon^e

("?efer to the

of Defendants, Douglas Kent and Richard

John Allvn Sr., to

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, oaraaraoh 2, served
upon the Plaintiff on July 21,
of

said

Defendants

to

1983, together with responses

Plaintiff's

Request

served upon Plaintiff on June 22, 198$.
Affidavit

of

Douglas

Kent

Allvn

for

Admissions

Also- refer to sai<*

which

is

attached

to

the

Memorandum.)
CONCLUSION
Since there is a question of fact as to whether or
not Plaintiff made misrepresentations

and

fraudulent state-

ments to said Defendants as to their personal liability in the
transaction, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
denied.

/
DATED this y/^^day of December, 1989.

^4(^^T
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify tnat '

-lail-H a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Memoran,: :~> in wpoosition to Motion for
Summary Judgment on this
prepaid

to John

/ L'j

"U / of December, 19P9, oostaa^

A. Anderson, *-v? c ^ r ,

MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Streo-, ^ ii\*
Salt Lake City, Utah

3A0LFY, CORMWA- r z

1610, P.O. Box 4S<^\

34145.
/
J r

/.

i

/ <"^

,- .1 y)<~

. f

/

{
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092
KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105
Anderson & Dunn
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Sale Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 944-0990
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATS OF UTAH
USA FINACIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES,
a California Partnership; DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ALLYN,
SR., dba ALLYN AND COMPANY,
a California Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6726
Honorable John A. Rokich

Defendants*
Come

now,

the

Defendants,

Douglas

Kent

Allyn,

Richard John Allyn, Sr. and Allyn and Company, a California
Partnership and pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure respond to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories
as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY

NO. 1:

With respect to Plaintiff's

First Set of Requests for Admissions, if your response to any
such request was anything but an unqualified admission, state
the following:

-2a.

All facts on which you base your denial or

b.

All pe sons with knowledge of facts that

response;

will substantiate your denial or response, including a brief
summary of each person's relevant knowledge; and
c.

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate to or substantiate your denial or response.
ANSWER:

(a)

See Amended Responses to Request for

Admissions.
(b) Jeff Perkins - Vice President of Interlake Thrift.

Chris Davis - Secretary for Jeff Perkins.

Doug

Arnett - Involved with Mr. Perkins under similar circumstances.
(c)

All documents

are

in possession of

Plaintiff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint,
state the following:
(a)

All facts on which you base your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

relate to your denial, including

a brief statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate, or substantiate your denial.
ANSWER:

(a)

This project, like the Parkway Village

project, was purchased with the assi.stanco of Jeff Perkins.

-3in fact, either Perkins or Interlace

received a commission

from Commerce Financial for the sale of this project.

The

initial money down for this transaction came from the amount
funded to Swank for the purchase of his part of Parkway Village.
Because efforts at getting a construction loan failed, Interlake agreed

to advance funds to J & D Properties, Inc. to

close the purchase of the land.

J » D Properties, Inc. is the

name Perkins represented to have had cleared with the state
prior to making the loan.

Originally, title to the land and

the loan were to be in the name of the corporation.

Commerce

Financial, however, had requested that their loan be made to
Swank since their documentation was already set up that way.
Douglas Kent Allyn signed Exhibits A, B and D as an officer of
J & D Properties, Inc.

He also understood Swank signed Exhibit

A, B, D, E and F as an officer of J & D Properties, Inc.

In

addition to relying on Perkins as far as the corporation went,
these Defendants relied on other representations explained in
paragraph 2(a) of these Defendants Responses to Interrogatories
for Case No. C86-6724, which is incorporated by this reference.
Not only were Defendants induced to sign documents, they also
assigned other property to Interlace as additional collateral
for the transaction.

All funds went to the project and not to

these Defendants personally.
(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

-4INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 9 of the Complaint,
state the following:
(a)

All

the

facts on which you base your

denial;
(b)

All persons with knowledge of the facts

that relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the
substance of each such person's knowledge? and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate, or substantiate your denial.
ANSWER:

(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above,

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 9 of the Complaint,
state the following:
(a)

All facts on which you base your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

relate to your denial, including

a brief statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

relate, or substantiate your denial.
ANSWER:

(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph 1(b) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

reflect,

INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint,
state the following:
(a)

All facts on which you base your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

relate to your denial, including

a brief

statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss, reflect,

relate, or substantiate your denial
ANSWER:

(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above,

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 11 of the Complaint,
state the following:
(a)

All facts on which you base your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

relate to your denial, including

a brief statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss, reflect,

relate, or substantiate your denial.
ANSWEB:

(a)

See parage iph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraoh !(:) above.

-6INTRRROGATORY NO. 7:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 12 of the Complaint,
state the following:
(a)

All facts on which you base your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

relate to your denial, including

a brief statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate, or substantiate your denial,
ANSWER:

(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 13 of the Complaint,
state the following:

relate

(a)

All facts on which you base your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

to your denial, including

a brief statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

'.hat discuss,

relate, or substantiate your denial.
ANSWER:

(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph 1(b) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

reflect,
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

With respect to your denial of

the allegations set forth in paragraph 14 of the Complaint,
state the following:

relate

(a)

All facts on which you oase your denial;

(b)

All persons with knowledge of facts that

to your denial, including

a brief statement of the

substance of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss, reflect,

relate, or substantiate your denial.
ANSWER:

(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY HO. 10:

Do you contend that Exhibit

"A" to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect
upon the Defendants?
(a)

If so, state the following:
The facts on which you base this conten-

tion, including but not limited to the following:
1.

All misrepresentations by Plaintiff;

2.

All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff;

3.

All "unfair" dots of Plaintiff as referred

to in paragraph 4 of your Answer; and
4.

All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff

entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions
as set forth in paragraph 4 of your Answer;

-8(b)

Identify all persons with knowledge of

any facts that substantiate such contention, including a brief
summary of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph 1(b) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. Ill

Do you contend that Exhibit

"B" to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect
upon the Defendants?
(a)

If so, state the following:
The facts on which you base this conten-

tion, including but not limited to the following:
1.

All misrepresentations by Plaintiff;

2.

All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff;

3.

All "unfair" acts of Plaintiff as referred

to in paragraph 5 of your Answer; and
4.

All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff

entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions
as set forth in paragraph 5 of your Answer;
(b)

Identify all persons with knowledge of

any facts that substantiate such contention, including a brief
summary of each such person's knowledge; and

-9(c)

All documents that discuss, reflect,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
AHStfBR:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

(b)

See paragraph K b ) above,

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

Do you contend that Exhibit

"C* to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect
upon the Defendants?
(a)

If so, state the following:
The facts on which you base this conten-

tion, including but not limited to the following:
1.

All misrepresentations by Plaintiff;

2.

All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff;

3.

All "unfair" acts of Plaintiff as referred

to in paragraph 6 of your Answer; and
4.

All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff

entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions
as set forth in paragraph 6 of your Answer?
(b)

Identify all persons with knowledge of

any facts that substantiate such conception, including a brief
summary of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ANSWER:

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above.

reflect,

-10(b)

See paragraph 1(b) above.

(c)

See paragraph lie) above.

INTERROGATORY BO, 13:

Do you contend that Exhibit

"D" to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect
upon the Defendants?
(a)

If so, state the following:
The facts on which you base this conten-

tion, including but not limited to the following:
1.

All misrepresentations by Plaintiff;

2.

All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff;

3.

Ail "unfair" acts of Plaintiff as referred

to in paragraph 7 of your Answer; and
4.

All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff

entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions
as set forth- in paragraph 7 of your Answer;
(b)

Identify all persons with knowledge of

any facts that substantiate such contention, including a brief
summary of each such person's knowledge; and
(c)

All

documents

that

discuss,

relate to or substantiate such contention.
ABSVBRt

Yes
(a)

See paragraph 2(a) above,

(b)

See paragraph lib) above.

(c)

See paragraph 1(c) above.

reflect,

personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person
represented nor shows that the representative signed in a
representative capacity. . . . "
(1980).

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403(2)(a)

Again, even if Allyn intended to sign the Promissory

Note in a representative capacity, since there is absolutely no
reference to J & D Properties, Inc. in the note or to his
representative capacity, Allyn is personally obligated on the
note.
While it is true that the trust deed, in contrast to
the promissory note, makes reference to J & D Properties, Inc.,
and Douglas Allyn apparently did execute that document in a
representative capacity, it is undisputed that he also executed
the trust deed in his individual capacity.

The signature line

clearly states that he is executing it in a dual capacity.
Further, the trust deed does not establish his personal liability
in the event of a default; rather, that liability is established
by the promissory note.

The trust deed merely encumbers the

property as security for the underlying obligation.

Thus, even

if Allyn had properly executed the trust deed only in behalf of J
& D Properties, Inc., that would not excuse his personal
liability on the promissory note, which bears no such
indorsement.

Since these documents were executed

contemporaneously, but there is no reference whatsoever in the
promissory note to J & D Properties, Inc., it is clear that

-10G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50

Allyn's defense is frivolous and interposed solely for the
purpose of delay.
3-

The Allvns Have Not Alleged nor Offered ^ny
Evidence to Establish that J & D Properties, Tpr
Was Sv?g IncoTPQm?d- Accordingly, the Allyna
Are Personally Liable for the Purported Contracts
Qt J & P ? r 9 P « t w f Inc«

Allyn alleges that he executed the Interlake Thrift
Loan documents in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc.

In order for

Allyn to so execute those documents, he would have had to have
been an authorized representative, agent or officer of that
corporation.

Allyn does not allege, however, that J & D

Properties, Inc. was ever incorporated in Utah or in any other
state.
It is well established that where a corporation is
never incorporated, or defectively incorporated, persons who
execute contracts in behalf of the corporation are personally
liable for the debts and obligations reflected by those
agreements.

Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-139 provides that "All

persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so
to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof."
Ann. S 16-10-139 (1980).

Utah Code

In gjUfram Advertising Ag?h?Yr Inc. v.

Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that
where the defendant executed an agreement in behalf of a

-11G:\WPl\159\0000010L.W50

corporation that did not exist, he was personally liable on the
obligation.

Id. at 165.

Even assuming that Allyn had executed the promissory
note itself in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc., since there is
no evidence offered to prove that J & D Properties, Inc. was ever
incorporated, Allyn is personally liable on the promissory note.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment on the
Commerce Financial Loan against John Swank.

Accordingly,

defendant is entitled to a sale of the trust deed property and to
entry of a deficiency judgment against Swank arising from such
sale.
Defendants have not contested the underlying liability
owed on the Interlake Thrift Loan nor default in the repayment of
that loan.

Defendants' only evidence offered in response to

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is barred by the parol
evidence rule as it is intended to add to, vary or contradict the
terms of a clear and unambiguous written instrument.

Further,

Allyn is liable in his personal capacity as an alleged
representative of J & D Properties, Inc. because he failed to
execute the promissory note in that capacity.

Finally, since

there is no evidence that J & D Properties, Inc. was ever
incorporated, Allyn is personally liable under Utah law for any
contracts purportedly executed in behalf of that nonexistent

-12G:\WPL\159\0000010l.W50

corporation.

For these reasons, Interlake Thrift is also

entitled to an order applying the proceeds from the sale of the
trust deed property remaining after satisfaction of the Commerce
Financial Loan, if any, to the Interlake Thrift Loan.

In the

event no such proceeds exist or are inadequate to satisfy the
Interlake Thrift Loan, then Interlake Thrift is entitled to a
judgment personally against Douglas Kent Allyn and a judgment
foreclosing Allyn and Company's interest in the limited
partnership known as PRB, Ltd.
DATED this

[\.ll^ day of January, 1990.
VAN COTT, BAGLByy) CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

i. A ^ r t ^ S^

"John /A. Jutererson
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment
was mailed, postage prepaid, this

f

Vf^day of January, 1990, to

the following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
John Burton Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & DUNN
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 9
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
PLAINTIFF
VS
SWANK, JOHN B

CASE NUMBER 860906726 CV
DATE 01/24/90
HONORABLE JOHN A ROKICH
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK MTR

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. ANDERSON, JOHN A.
D. ATTY. ANDERSON, JOHN B.

THE COURT RULES ON REQUEST FOR RULING TO WIT;
"PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ARE GRANTED FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM."
CC JOHN A. ANDERSON
JOHN B. ANDERSON

EXHIBIT G

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

)

JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. C86-6724
Honorable Timothy R. Hanso

)

USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN B. SWANK an individual,
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba
ALLYN AND COMPANY, a
partnership; all dba Parkway
Village, a Joint Venture,

Civil No. C86-6725
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

EXHIBIT H

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") having moved for entry
of a default judgment against defendant John B. Swank, whose
default was entered by the Clerk of this Court on February 23,
1989; and Interlake having moved for summary judgment against
defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John Allyn, Sr., and Allyn
and Company (the "Allyn Defendants"), and this Court having
entered its Minute Entry dated January 5, 1990, granting
plaintiff's motions for entry of default and summary judgments,
and having denied the ex parte motion of the Allyn defendants for
additional time within which to file a response to the motion for
summary judgment, and good cause appearing herefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The ex parte motion of the Allyn Defendants for

additional time within which to file a response to plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.
2.

The motion of plaintiff Interlake for default

judgment against defendant John B. Swank is hereby granted.
3.

The motion of plaintiff Interlake for summary

judgment against defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John
Allyn, and Allyn and Company, a California partnership, is hereby
granted.
4.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under that

certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Loan No. L100142)
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(the "First Promissory Note") the sum of $643,560.98, which sum
includes outstanding principal and interest to and including
January 19, 1990. Interest continues to accrue on the First
Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $166.53.
5.

That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of

Rents ("First Trust Deed") duly recorded in the Office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder on October 10, 1985 as Entry No.
4149377 at Book 5899, Page 612, and rerecorded to correct an
error in the legal description on December 4, 1988 as Entry No.
4171946, at Book 4714, Page 2804, constitutes a valid, perfected,
first-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake
County, Utah to-wit:
Parcels 1, 2, and 3 as described in the attached
Exhibit A.
6.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under that

certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Loan No. L100141)
(the "Second Promissory Note") the sum of $354,034.33, which sum
includes outstanding principal and interest to and including
January 19, 1990. Interest continues to accrue on the Second
Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $79.77.
7.

That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of

Rents ("Second Trust Deed") duly recorded in the Office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder on October 10, 1985 as Entry No.
4149379 at Book 5699, Page 619, constitutes a valid, perfected,
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second-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake
County, Utah to-wit:
Parcel 1 as described in the attached Exhibit
"A. "
8.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under that

certain Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 (Loan 9141) (the
"Fourth Promissory Note") the sum of $198,877.63, which sum
includes outstanding principal and accrued interest to and
including January 19, 1990.

Interest continues to accrue on the

Fourth Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $51.46.
9.

That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of

Rents (the "Fourth Trust Deed") duly recorded in the Office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder on March 21, 1986 as Entry No.
4248675 at Book 5769, Page 1122 constitutes a valid perfected,
third-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake
County, Utah to-wit:
Parcel 1 as described in the attached Exhibit
"A. "
10.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under that

certain Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 (Loan No. 9142) (the
"Third Promissory Note") the sum of $62,882.41, which sum
includes outstanding principal and accrued interest to and
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including January 19, 1990.

Interest continues to accrue on the

Third Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $16.27.
11.

That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of

Rents (the "Third Trust Deed") duly recorded in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder on July 15, 1986 as Entry No. 4278658
at Book 5790, Page 2068, constitutes a valid, perfected, secondpriority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following described
real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake County, Utah
to-wit:
Parcels 2 and 3 as described in the attached
Exhibit "A."
12.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under the

First, Second, Third and Fourth Promissory Notes the sum of
$9,942.50, which sum represents the attorneys' fees incurred to
and including November 1, 1989, in collecting the amounts due
under the subject promissory notes and the subject trust deeds.
There also is now due and owing to Interlake the attorneys' fees
which it has incurred from November 1, 1989 to and including the
foreclosure of the Property in an amount to be established by
affidavit.

The amount of attorneys' fees incurred by November 1,

1989 shall be prorated between the respective promissory notes
and included in the amounts due thereunder.

The amount of

attorney's fees which have and will be incurred from November 1,
1989 to the date of foreclosure shall be added to any deficiency
resulting from the sale of the Property, or if a surplus results
-5G:\WPL\159\00000239.W50

from such sale, then the remaining attorneys' fees shall be paid
from such surplus pursuant to further order of this Court.
13.

The First Promissory Note and First Trust Deed,

the Second Promissory Note and Second Trust Deed, the Third
Promissory Note and Third Trust Deed, and the Fourth Promissory
Note and Fourth Trust Deed, shall be foreclosed and the Property
sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, according to the laws
and practices of this Court.

The Sheriff shall first sell Parcel

1 as described in the attached Exhibit "A," and then shall sell
Parcels 2 and 3 together as described in the attached Exhibit
"A."

The proceeds from such sales shall be disbursed as follows:
a.

The Sheriff shall retain first his costs,

disbursements, and commissions;
b.

The Sheriff shall then pay to Interlake, or

its attorneys, the amount owing to Interlake under the First
Promissory Note and First Trust Deed or so much of said sum as
the proceeds will pay by first applying the proceeds from the
sale of Parcels 2 and 3 and, then, if any balance remains due,
applying the proceeds from the sale of Parcel 1.

In calculating

the amount due under the First Promissory Note, as well as the
remaining promissory notes, the Sheriff shall include all
interest which has accrued from January 19, 1990 to the date of
the sale based on the per diem rates set forth herein;
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c.

The surplus proceeds from the sale of Parcel

1, if any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its attorneys, for
the amount owing to Interlake under the Second Promissory Note
and Second Trust Deed, or so much of said sum as the proceeds
will pay;
d.

The surplus proceeds from the sale of Parcel

1, if any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its attorneys, for
the amount owing to Interlake under the Fourth Promissory Note
and Fourth Trust Deed, or so much of said sum as the proceeds
will pay;
e.

The surplus proceeds from the sale of Parcels

2 and 3, if any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its
attorneys, for the amount owing to Interlake under the Third
Promissory Note and Third Trust Deed, or so much of said sum as
the proceeds will pay; and
f.

The remaining surplus, if any, shall be

accounted for and turned over to the Clerk of the Court subject
to this Court's further order.
14.

Interlake may become a purchaser at said sale, and

following said sale, the Sheriff shall issue his Certificate of
Sale to the purchaser and his Sheriff's Deed to the holder
thereof upon the expiration of the period of redemption, and upon
the issuance of the Sheriff's Deed, all right, title and interest
of the above-named defendants, and each of them, in and to the
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Property shall be forever barred and foreclosed.

If a deficiency

results after application of the proceeds of the sale and
foreclosure, as hereinabove provided, Interlake shall be entitled
to have and recover a judgment on the First Promissory Note and
First Trust Deed, Second Promissory Note and Second Trust Deed,
Third Promissory Note and Third Trust Deed, and Fourth Promissory
Note and Fourth Trust Deed, against Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard
John Allyn, Sr., Allyn and Company, and John B. Swank for the
full amount of the deficiency.
15.

Interlake is entitled to the possession of the

Property, and shall have the right to manage and control the
Property during the pendency of this action and during the
statutory six month redemption period, including the right to
execute, modify or terminate leases, to collect and use and
retain as Interlake's sole and separate Property all rents and
revenues of the Property and to personally manage the Property or
enter into agreements for the management of the Property.
16.

Interlake shall be entitled to all rents and

revenues of the Property from and after January 19, 1990, and
John Swank and the Allyn Defendants shall turn over to Interlake
all rents and revenues of the Property received by them and shall
direct all tenants of the Property to pay all future rents to
Interlake.
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17.

Interlake, the Allyn Defendants, and John B. Swank

are authorized, ordered and directed to perform in accordance
with the terms of this Order and Decree of Foreclosure.
DATED this

day of
BY THE COURT:

Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge
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, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order and Decree of Foreclosure was mailed, postage
prepaid, this "?/$/* day of

to the

following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
John Burton Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & DUNN
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4 906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
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EXHIBIT "A"
PARCEL 1:
Beginning at a point North 281.687 feet and
West 806.668 feet from the Salt Lake City
Monument marking the intersection of 1000
West Street and 1700 South Street, said point
being located North 384.989 feet and West
555.875 feet from the Center of Section 14,
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian and running thence South
89§3'00" West 187.939 feet to a point of a
815.369 foot radius curve to the right
(radius point bears South 83i7 * 33M East)
thence Northeasterly along the arc of said
curve 9.538
feet through a central angle of
040 ' 13M to a point of tangency on a 875.539
foot radius curve to the left (radius point
bears North 8237' 20" West); thence
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve
112.740 feet through a central angle of
722'40"; thence North 0.12 feet; thence
North 89§3*00" East 94.958 feet; thence
South 8932'00" East 17.678 feet; thence
South 0fl7'00" East 95.817 feet; thence North
89§3'00" East 66.636 feet to a point of
tangency on a 37.00 foot radius curve to the
left (radius point bears North 067'00"
West); thence Northeasterly along the arc of
said curve 30.599 feet through a central
angle of 47^3' 00"; thence North 47^0' West
20.50 feet? thence North 4230'00" East
77.599 feet; thence South 4730*00" East
46.50 feet; thence South 4230*00" West
77.599 feet to a point of tangency on a 63.00
foot radius curve to the right (radius point
bears North 4730' West); thence
Southwesterly along the arc of said curve
52.101 feet through a central angle of
4723'00" to the point of beginning.
PARCEL 2:
Beginning at a point 284 feet North and 787
feet West from the Southeast corner of the
Northwest k of Section 14, Township 1 South,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
and running thence East 279.108 feet, more or
less to a fence; thence North 1340' East
223.575 feet, more or less, to the South line

of Wenco Acres Subdivision; the West 387.3
feet, more or less, to the East line of the
Jordan River Parkway property, as conveyed in
that certain Warranty Deed dated December 8,
1975 and recorded February 3, 1976 as Entry
No. 2782436 in Book 4094 at page 428; thence
along said East line South 1413'29M East
224.76 feet, more or less to the point of
beginning.
LESS AND EXCEPTING THE FOLLOWING TWO PARCELS:
Beginning at a point South 89§3' West 50.02
from the Southwest corner of Lot 15, Wenco
Acres Subdivision, being a part of Section
14, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, said point being North
00ll'15" East 403.22 feet along the monument
line and West 1038.71 feet from the Salt Lake
City monument marking the intersection of
1000 West Street and 1700 South street and
running thence South 0l43*50" East 217.33
feet to the South line of grantors land;
thence South 39§5'53" West 00.54 feet along
said South line; thence North 14i3 ' 29M West
224.00 feet along the East boundary of the
Jordan River Parkway land, thence North
89§3' East 49.02 feet to the point of
beginning.
Beginning at a point North 281.687 feet and
West 806.668 feet from the Salt Lake City
Monument marking the intersection of 1000
West Street and 1700 South Street, said point
being located North 384.989 feet and West
555.875 feet from the Center of Section 14,
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian and running thence South
89§3'00" West 187.939 feet to a point of a
815.369 foot radius curve to the right
(radius point bears South 83l7'33" East)
thence Northeasterly along the arc of said
curve 9.538 feet through a central angle of
040'13" to a point of tangency on a 875.539
foot radius curve to the left (radius point
bears North 8237'20" West); thence
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve
112.740 feet through a central angle of
7^2'40"? thence North 0.12 feet; thence
North 89§3'00" East 94.958 feet; thence
South 8932'00" East 12*678 feet; thence
G:\wPL\i59\ooooo25tow6h 0fl7 ' 0 0 " East 95.817 feet; thence North

89§3'00" East 66.636 feet to a point of
tangency on a 37.00 foot radius curve to the
left (radius point bears North Gfl7'00"
West); thence Northeasterly along the arc of
said curve 30.599 feet through a central
angle of 4723'00"; thence North 4730' West
20.50 feet; thence North 4230,00" East
77.599 feet; thence South 4730'00" East
46.50 feet; thence South 4230'00" West
77.599 feet to a point of tangency on a 63.00
foot radius curve to the right (radius point
bears North 47^0' West); thence
Southwesterly along the arc of said curve
52.101 feet through a central angle of
4723'00" to the point of beginning.
PARCEL 3:
Beginning at a point 155 feet North and 807
feet West from the center of Section 14,
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, said point being on the
Northerly Right-of-Way line of 1700 South and
the Easterly line of the Provo Jordan River
Parkway Authority property and running thence
North 2l9'21" East 129.16 feet along the
Jordan River Parkway; thence East 30.00 feet;
thence South OflO'21" East 129.050 feet to
the North Right-of-Way line of 1700 South;
thence South 89§9'39" West along said Rightof-Way line 35.247 feet to the point of
beginning.
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Thomas T. Billings, Bar No. 0331
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
dba Interlake Thrift Mortgage Division, a Utah
corporation,

ORDER AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

Plaintiff,
vs,
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS
KENT ALLYN dba J & D
PROPERTIES, a California
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND
COMPANY, a California
Partnership,

Civil No. C86-6726
Honorable John A. Rokich

Defendants.

Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") having moved for entry
of a default judgment against defendant John B. Swank, whose
default was entered by the Clerk of this Court on February 23,
1989; and Interlake having moved for summary judgment against
defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John Allyn, Sr., and Allyn
and Company (the "Allyn Defendant"), and this Court having
entered its Minute Entry dated January 24, 1990, granting

plaintiff's motion for entry of default and summary judgments,
and good cause appear herefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The motion of plaintiff Interlake for default

judgment against defendant John B. Swank is hereby granted.
2.

The motion of plaintiff Interlake for summary

judgment against defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John
Allyn, and Allyn and Company, a California partnership, is hereby
granted.
3.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under that

certain Promissory Note dated November 5, 1985 (the "Commerce
Financial Note") the sum of $866,550.08, which sum includes
outstanding principal and interest to and including January 26,
1990.

Interest continues to accrue on the Commerce Financial

Note at the rate of $264.54 per diem.
4.

That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of

Rents dated November 5, 1985 ("Commerce Financial Trust Deed")
duly recorded in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on
November 6, 1985, as Entry No. 4160854 at Book 5707, Page 793,
constitutes a valid, perfected, first-priority lien in favor of
Interlake upon the following described real property (the
"Property") situated in Salt Lake County, Utah to-wit:
See property description in attached Exhibit "A."

-2G:\WPl\159\000002AP.W50

5.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under that

certain Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985, (the "Interlake
Thrift Note") the sum of $382,655.82, which sum includes
outstanding principal and interest to and including January 26,
1990.

Interest continues to accrue on the Interlake Thrift Note

at the rate of $123.96 per diem.
6.

That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of

Rents ("Interlake Thrift Trust Deed") duly recorded in the office
of the Salt Lake County Recorder on March 7, 1986, as Entry No.
4211971 at Book 5742, Page 2990, constitutes a valid, perfected,
second-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake
County, Utah, to-wit:
See the property description in attached Exhibit "A."
7.

That certain Assignment duly recorded in the

Official Records of Los Angeles County, California on March 11,
1986 as Entry No. 86-303592, constitutes a valid sale and/or
assignment to Interlake of Allyn and Company's limited
partnership interest, in the amount of 16.3636%, in PRB, Ltd.s
interest in and to the following described real property situated
in Los Angeles County, California, to-wit:
See the property description in attached Exhibit "B."
In the event the above-described Property has been sold, or this
interest has otherwise been impaired, then a lien shall attach to
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Allyn & Company's share in and to the proceeds from any such
sale.
8.

There is now due and owing to Interlake under the

Commerce Financial Note and Interlake Thrift Note the additional
sum of $5,948.75, which sum represents the attorneys' fees
incurred by Interlake to and including November 1, 1989, in
collecting the amounts due under the Commerce Financial and
Interlake Thrift Promissory Notes and the subject Trust Deeds.
There also is now due and owing to Interlake the attorneys' fees
which it has incurred from November 1, 1989 to and including the
date of foreclosure of the Property in an amount to be
established by affidavit.

The amount of attorneys' fees incurred

by November 1, 1989 shall be pro rated between the respective
promissory notes and included in the amounts due thereunder.

The

amount of attorneys' fees which have been incurred from November
lf 1989 to the date of foreclosure shall be added to any
deficiency resulting from the sale of the property, or if a
surplus results from such sale, then the remaining attorneys'
fees shall be paid from such surplus pursuant to further order of
this Court.
9.

The Assignment is hereby foreclosed and the

interest of Allyn and Company in PRB, Ltd.'s interest in the real
property located in Los Angeles County, State of California
(Exhibit B) shall be the sole property of Interlake.
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All right,

title and interest of Allyn and Company, and/or its partners, in
said property is hereby forever barred and foreclosed.
10.

The Commerce Financial Note and the Interlake

Thrift Note shall be foreclosed and the Property sold by the
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, according to the laws and practices
of this Court.

The Sheriff, out of such proceeds, shall retain

first his costs, disbursements, commissions, and then pay to
Interlake, or its attorneys, the amount owing to Interlake under
the Commerce Financial Note and Commerce Financial Trust Deed or
so much of said sum as the proceeds will pay.

The surplus, if

any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its attorneys, for the
amount owing to Interlake under the Interlake Thrift Promissory
Note and Interlake Thrift Trust Deed or so much of said sum as
the proceeds will pay.

In calculating the amounts due under the

Commerce Financial and Interlake Promissory Notes, the Sheriff
shall include interest which accrues between January 26, 1990 and
the date of sale based on the per diem rates set forth herein.
The remaining surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and turned
over to the Clerk of the Court and is subject to this Court's
further order.
11.

Interlake may become a purchaser at said sale, and

following said sale, the Sheriff shall issue his Certificate of
Sale to the purchasers and his Sheriff's Deed to the holder
thereof upon the expiration of the period of redemption, and upon
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the issuance of the Sheriff's Deed, all right, title and interest
of the above-named defendants, and each of them, in and to the
Property shall be forever barred and foreclosed.
12.

If a deficiency results after application of the

proceeds of the sale and foreclosure, as hereinabove provided,
Interlake shall be entitled to have and recover a judgment on the
Commerce Financial Note against defendant John B. Swank for the
full amount of the deficiency.

Interlake shall also be entitled

to have and recover a judgment on the Interlake Thrift Promissory
Note and Interlake Thrift Trust Deed against John B. Swankf
Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John Allyn, Sr., and Allyn and
Company.
13.

Interlake is entitled to the possession of the

Property, and shall have the right to manage and control the
Property during the pendency of this action and during the
statutory six month redemption period, including the right to
execute, modify or terminate leases, to collect and use and
retain as Interlake's sole and separate property all rents and
revenues of the Property and to personally manage the Property or
enter into agreements for the management of the Property.
14.

Interlake shall be entitled to all rents and

revenues of the Property from and after January 26, 1990, and
John Swank and the Allyn Defendants shall turn over to Interlake
all rents and revenues of the Property received by them and shall
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direct all tenants of the Property to pay all future rents to
Interlake.
15.

Interlake, the Allyn Defendants, and John B. Swank

are authorized, ordered and directed to perform in accordance
with the terms of this Order and Decree of Foreclosure.
DATED this

day of
BY THE COURT:

John A. Rokich
District Court Judge
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, 1990.

CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order and Decree of Foreclosures was mailed, postage
prepaid, this ? M ~ ~ d a y o r ^ ^ > ^ ^ — F

1990f to the

following:
John B. Swank
114 Flag Way
Pasa Robles, California 93447
John Burton Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & DUNN
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Richard John Allyn, Sr.
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
Allyn and Company
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn
4906 New Ranch Road
El Cajon, California 92020
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EXHIBIT "A
Parcel It
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3, Block 36, Plat "B",
Salt Lake City Survey and running thence South 82*5 feet; thence
West 54 feet; thence North 155 feet; thence East 54 feet; thence
South 72*3 feet to the place of beginning•
Parcel ?:
Beginning at a point 54 feet West of the Northeast corner of Lot
3, Block 36 Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey and running thence
South 82*5 feet; thence West 37 feet; thence North 155 feet;
thence East 37 feet; thence South 72*5 feet to the place of
beginning.
Parcel 3?
Beginning 91 feet West of the Northeast corner of Lot 3, Block
36, Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence south 82*5
feet; thence West 37 feet; thence North 155 feet; thence East 37
feet; thence South 72*5 feet to the place of beginning.
Parcel 4:
Beginning at
Lot 3, Block
thence South
feet; thence
beginning.

a point 128 feet West from the Northeast corner of
36 Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey and running
82*5 feet; thence West 37 feet; thence North 155
East 37 feet; thence South 72*5 feet to the point of

Together with a Right of Way over: Beginning 72*5 feet North of
the Southeast corner of Lot 4, in said Block and running thence
West 330 feet; thence North 10 feet; thence East 330 feet; thence
South 10 feet to the place of beginning.

Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, Bock 36, Plat "B",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence South 82*5 feet; thence
East 165 feet; thence North 82*5 feet; thence West 165 feet to the
point of beginning.
Together with a Right of Way over the following: Beginning 82*5
feet South from the Northwest corner of Lot 4, and running thence
South 10 feet; thence East 175 feet; thence North 10 feet; thence
West 175 feet to the point of beginning.
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EXHIBIT "B"
Parcel 23, Book 8302, Page 22 of the Tax Assessor's Rolls for Los
Angeles County consisting of 2.02 acres legally described as
follows:
"That portion of the East half of the West half of the
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 5,
Township 1 South, Range 9 West, San Bernardino Meridian, in
the County of Los Angeles, State of California, according
to the official plat thereof, described as follows:
Beginning at a point in the South line of said East half,
distant thereon North 8926'30" West 32.50 feet from the
Southeast corner of said East half; thence parallel with
the East line of said East half, North 060*58" West 350.00
feet; thence parallel with said South line, North 8926*30"
West 293.04 feet, more or less, to the West line of said
East half; thence Southerly and Easterly along the West and
South lines of said East half to the point of beginning.
Except therefrom the South 30.00 feet of said East half."
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